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Abstract
Traditional evolutionary theory often treats selective forces from the
environment and the adaptation of populations as independent of each other,
focusing on the effects of natural selection on population dynamics. The
fitness landscape is considered to be static, and adaptation is taken as a
process of optimisation. In this thesis, I intend to call attention to the inter-
actions between the environment and biological populations, emphasising the
feedbacks from the population to the environment that changes the direction,
rate and dynamics of the evolutionary process.
Two general approaches through which populations affect their environ-
ment are studied in this thesis. The first one is via life history and demographic
architecture of the population. The second one is through interactions among
individuals of the same or different types in the population. These two ap-
proaches are not inter-exclusive, but rather interact and reinforce each other.
Evolutionary game theory provides a convenient framework of modelling
interactions, but it usually takes no account of the life history aspects of
the organisms in the population. Demographic models, on the other hand,
emphasise the optimisation of life history traits, while neglecting interactions
among individuals in the population. One major innovation in this thesis
project is to build a system that takes into account both aspects and connects
the two theoretical frameworks. This is realised by defining age/life-stage
dependent strategies. The behaviours of individuals are conditioned on the
age/life-stage of the players involved in the interactions. The dynamics of the
system are studied under both deterministic and stochastic frameworks.
Besides an analytical and numerical study of abstract mathematical mod-
els, this thesis also includes collaborative projects with experiments in real
biological systems. In one modelling project, we show how complex popula-
tion dynamics can emerge from a simple system of two bacteria species, under
frequency dependent selection. Preliminary experimental evidence suggests
that the infection and cross-infection of phages might have produced such
frequency dependent effects. We continue the investigation in a follow up
project.
Covering diverse subjects and employing various methods and mathemat-
ical techniques, this thesis summarises my research in the last three years,
raises new questions, and opens up opportunities for future investigations.
ii
Kurzfassung
Die traditionelle Evolutionstheorie behandelt die selektiven Kräfte der
Umwelt und die Anpassung von Populationen meistens als voneinander
unabhängig. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf den Effekten, die natürliche Selektion
auf die Populationsdynamik ausübt. Die Fitnesslandschaft wird als statisch
angesehen und Anpassung ist somit ein Optimierungsprozess. In dieser
Arbeit zeige ich die Bedeutung der Interaktionen zwischen der Umwelt und
natürlichen Populationen und hebe dabei die Rückkopplungen hervor, die die
Population auf die Umwelt hat und die die Richtung, Rate und Dynamik des
evolutionären Prozesses ändern.
In dieser Arbeit werden zwei generelle Ansätze untersucht, durch welche
die Population ihre Umwelt beeinflusst. Der erste Ansatz behandelt die
Lebensgeschichte und demografische Struktur der Population. Der Zweite
betrachtet die Interaktionen zwischen Individuen der gleichen Spezies oder
zwischen verschiedenen Spezies. Diese beiden Ansätze werden hier nicht nur
separat betrachtet; vielmehr beeinflussen und verstärken sie sich gegenseitig.
Die Spieltheorie modelliert genau solche Interaktionen. Sie berücksichtigt
normalerweise jedoch keine lebenshistorischen Aspekte der Individuen der
Population. Demographische Modelle hingegen betonen die Optimierung
der lebenshistorischen Merkmale, vernachlässigen gleichzeitig allerdings In-
teraktionen zwischen Individuen der Population. Eine wesentliche Innovation
dieser Doktorarbeit ist die Untersuchung eines Systems, das beide Ansätze
berücksichtigt und diese verbindet. Dies wird durch die Definition von alters-
bzw. lebensphasensabhängigen Strategien umgesetzt. Das Verhalten von In-
dividuen ist abhängig vom Alter und Lebensstadium der miteinander inter-
agierenden Spieler. Die Dynamik des Systems wird sowohl mit determinis-
chtischen als auch stochastischen Modellen untersucht.
Neben rein analytischen und numerischen Betrachtungen abstrakter math-
ematischer Modelle, beinhaltet diese Arbeit auch Projekte, die direkt auf bi-
ologischen Experimenten aufbauen. In einem Projekt zeigen wir, dass unter
frequenzabhängiger Selektion ein relativ einfaches System mit zwei Bakterien-
stämmen zu einer komplexen Populationsdynamik führen kann. Vorläufige
experimentelle Daten lassen vermuten, dass Infektionen und Kreuzinfektio-
nen von Phagen zu frequenzabhängigen Effekten führen können. Wir ver-
tiefen daher die Untersuchung des zugrunde liegenden Mechanismus solcher
frequenzabhängigen Effekte in einem Kapitel dieser Arbeit.
Diese Arbeit fasst die Untersuchungen meiner Doktorarbeit zusammen,
sie umfasst verschiedene Fachgebiete, wendet dabei diverse Methoden und
mathematische Techniken an. Gleichzeitig bildet sie den Nährboden für neue
Fragen und zeigt somit zukünftige Forschungsarbeiten auf.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mathematical modelling has been playing an important role in analysing and
validating the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. For exam-
ple, one of the greatest early achievements was to show that genetic variation
is preserved under the Mendelian hereditary system. The Hardy-Weinberg
law shows that the genetic variation needed for natural selection has no in-
trinsic tendency to diminish. Assuming no selection, mutation, or any other
disturbing force such as the randomness in finite size populations, different
alleles, once established will remain, and their frequencies will keep unchanged
from one generation to the next.
Mathematical modelling also helps us understand quantitatively the evolu-
tionary dynamics of new genetic types. For example, following the emergence
of a beneficial mutant, deterministic mathematical models can make predic-
tions on the rate at which the mutant type is incorporated into a population
by natural selection. Beyond the deterministic regime, facilitated by proba-
bility and stochastic process theory, the role of random fluctuations in gene
frequencies can be evaluated, in biological populations of finite sizes. As an
example, the probability at which a mutant type fixes in a population, and
the time it takes until fixation can be studied using stochastic mathematical
models. Furthermore, the emergence and rapid development of the whole field
of bioinformatics that currently analyses complexity at the whole genome (and
other -omes) level are only possible with the help of mathematical models.
Popular modelling frameworks in evolutionary biology include population
genetics, evolutionary game theory, adaptive dynamics, and life-history op-
timisation. These different modelling frameworks all have their merits and
limitations, and they are best applied for solving different problems. In this
thesis, evolutionary game theory and life history theory are used. Building
on these two existing theoretical frameworks, I try to build a bridge which
connects the two fields, facilitating the exchange of ideas. In the following
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sections of this introduction, I will first introduce the basic concepts of evolu-
tionary game theory and life history theory, and then introduce the necessity
of integrating both.
1.1 Evolutionary game theory
1.1.1 Classic game theory
Economy is hard to predict. Unlike the weather, a forecast usually does not
influence the outcome, a prediction on the economy, especially when it is
announced to the public, almost always changes the outcome tremendously.
The “mission impossible” of predicting the Austrian economy kept tormenting
the economist Oskar Morgenstern, who has been working in the Institute for
Business Cycles Research (Institut für Konjunkturforschung) in Vienna in the
1930s. To quote the brilliant metaphor of his own, the never ending chasing
game between economists and the economy is like the never ending pursuit of
Sherlock Holmes by the infamous Professor Moriarty [Leonard, 2010].
After years of suffering from and broadcasting his trouble with the “impos-
sibility theorem of economic prediction”, Morgenstern was introduced by the
Czech mathematician Eduard Čech, to a paper of John von Neumann on par-
lor games [von Neumann, 1928]. This seminal paper provided the first reliever
to Morgenstern’s headache. Furthermore, it eventually led to the important
collaboration of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], which gave birth to
classic game theory.
Among the classical game theory models, the prisoner’s dilemma is an
interesting case. Using it as an example we introduce a few basic concepts
of game theory that is needed later, such as the strategy, the payoff matrix,
and the Nash Equilibrium. The scenario of prisoner’s dilemma was nicely
described by Poundstone [1992] as the following:
Two members of a criminal-gang are arrested and imprisoned.
Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of commu-
nicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence
to convict the pair on the principal charge. They hope to get
both sentenced to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultane-
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ously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner
is given the opportunity either to: betray the other by testifying
that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other
by remaining silent. The offer is:
• If A and B each betray the other, each of them serves 2 years
in prison;
• If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B
will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa);
• If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve
1 year in prison (on the lesser charge).
Important information for predicting the prisoners’ behaviours in the story
can be summarised in the form of a payoff matrix
(Betray Cooperate
Betray −2 0
Cooperate −3 −1
)
. (1.1)
The choices of behaviours that the prisoners can make are called strategies. In
this case, they could either “betray” the other by testifying the joined crime,
or “cooperate” with the other by remaining silent. The entries of the matrix
are the payoffs from strategy interactions. In this particular case, those are
the numbers of years they would serve in prison. The payoff matrix is a very
informative way to describe the outcome of strategy interactions.
Forced to play the strategic game against each other, the rational prisoners
(let’s call them Alice and Bob) need to find the “best reply” to what the other
player does. Alice would think like this, “if Bob cooperates, it is better for
me to betray, so that I can immediately walk out free; even if he betrays, it
is still better to betray as well, two years in prison is nevertheless better than
three years. So I should choose to betray no matter what Bob chooses to
do”. Unfortunately, Bob is equally rational and thinks the same. Therefore
they both choose the “best reply”, betraying each other and thereby serving
two years in prison. The two strategies (i.e. “Betray” for Alice and “Betray”
for Bob) are said to form a Nash Equilibrium pair since each is a best reply
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to the other. The choices of Alice and Bob satisfy a minimal consistency
requirement: no one has an incentive to deviate.
Paradoxically, the “rational choice” of betraying each other led both pris-
oners serving two years in jail, which is worse than the situation of serving
only one year if they have kept silent. The prisoner’s dilemma shows that
sometimes choosing strategies corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium may
not produce the best results for the players. It also shows the difficulty of
cooperation in general. To cooperate, individuals have to pay a personal cost
in order to benefit others. Consequently, the cooperators would have worse
payoffs compared with the cheaters, who refuse to pay the cost of cooperation,
but still receive the benefits. Therefore, cheaters can invade a population of
cooperators, leading the to the unfortunate Nash Equilibrium where everyone
has a lower payoff than if they have cooperated.
Interestingly however, cooperation prevails in nature. Natural selection
has produced various ways that allow cooperation to evolve [Nowak, 2006b].
A classic example is the food sharing behaviour observed in vampire bats
[Wilkinson, 1984]. The bats can only feed on blood and will die after just
70 hours of not eating. Therefore regurgitating blood from the stomach and
sharing it with another bat is of great benefit to the receiver but also incurs
a great cost to the donor. Cooperation among the bats is maintained by a
strategy called “tit-for-tat”. Namely, a bat that has behaved altruistically in
the past are helped by the others in the future. A bat that has refused to
help the others will get declined, too, when itself is in need of help. Although
the nature of the blood sharing behaviour among vampire bats is still under
debate [Carter and Wilkinson, 2013], studies of mathematical models have
shown that reciprocity in repeated interactions can provide a way of escaping
from the prisoner’s dilemma [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; McElreath and
Boyd, 2008; Nowak, 2006a].
In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, the unique Nash Equilibrium is
a pure strategy for both players (i.e. always betray). In other games, it
can be better to randomise one’s choices rather than sticking to a fixed pure
strategy. The children’s game Rock-Paper-Scissors provides one interesting
example. Following the simple rules that Rock smashes Scissors, Scissors cut
Paper, and Paper wraps Rock, the winner gets a points and the loser loses b
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points (a, b > 0) in each round of the contest. Written in the form of a payoff
matrix, the game summarises to

Rock Scissors Paper
Rock 0 a −b
Scissors −b 0 a
Paper a −b 0
. (1.2)
In this case, the unique Nash equilibrium for both players is to choose Rock or
Scissors or Paper randomly with equal probabilities. Letting chance decide,
mixed strategy makes sure the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in any n-person
game, in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies. The proof of
the existence of a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium was given in the classic
paper of Nash [1950].
The interesting cyclic dominance of strategies in the Rock-Paper-Scissors
game is not only an artificial design of a children’s game. It has been ob-
served in many ecosystems in nature, providing an important way of main-
taining biodiversity. We discuss this in more detail later, in section 1.1.6 of
the introduction.
Work on classic game theory has produced interesting mathematical and
economic developments. But it only considers the cases where specific indi-
viduals of players trying to guess each other’s strategy and find a best reply.
Classic game theory confronts difficulties when it comes to deal with problems
involving strategy dynamics in populations, such as explaining the sex ratio
of animal populations and the ritual competition behaviours without a real
fight or killing. This leads to the birth of evolutionary game theory.
1.1.2 From individuals to populations
“The greatest conceptual revolution in biology... the replacement
of typological thinking by population thinking.” – Ernst Mayr
Evolutionary game theory was originally developed by Maynard Smith
and Price [1973] for explaining the “limited war” among animals. It is not
surprising that animals fight for limited resources, such as mates, dominance
rights, desirable territories, etc. Through such combats, the winners have
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more chances to transmit their genes to the next generation than the losers.
Consequently, it is natural to imagine that nature would select for individuals
that has the most effective weapons in fighting against competitors. If the
rival is killed or seriously injured, the winner would be more likely to spread
its genes, and thus the frequency of the reckless type in the next generations
should grow. In the long run, however, it would lead to the suicide of the
species, if it follows the above mentioned logic.
Fortunately, this is not how nature works. In real animal conflicts, the
competitors seldom escalate the war but rather use inefficient weapons or
ritualised tactics that do not cause serious damage to any of the contestants.
Using an example cited in the original paper of Maynard Smith and Price
[1973], in many species of snakes, the males fight by wrestling without using
their fangs [Shaw, 1948]. Peaceful contests like such obviously are good for the
overall benefit of the species, but it is puzzling how natural selection achieves
those good solutions.
The more complicated interactions in the original work of Maynard Smith
and Price [1973] were later on summarised into a simple toy model, called
the Hawk-Dove game. It describes the interactions of two strategies in a
population of players. The payoff matrix is as follows:
( Hawk Dove
Hawk (v − c)/2 v
Dove 0 v/2
)
(1.3)
In the payoff matrix, v stands for the value of the resource and c stands for
the cost of a devastating fight. It assumes that whenever two Hawks meet, or
two Doves, both are equally likely to win. Therefore their expected payoff are
(v − c)/2 and v/2, respectively. If a Hawk and a Dove meet, the Dove fleas
with 0 gain and the Hawk gets the whole resource v without any additional
cost. Note that c > v, namely, the cost of conflict exceeds the value of the
resource.
Now think in terms of animal populations. A homogenous population of
Doves can be easily invaded by a few Hawks, who win all contests without
a fight. Conversely, a homogenous population of Hawks can also be invaded
by a few Doves. Although a Dove has no gain from flying away in front of
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a competitor, it is still better than the negative payoff of Hawks who keep
tearing at each other. Therefore neither strategy alone is stable in the long
run. Evolution will lead to a mixed population of both Hawks and Doves.
From the example of this extremely simplified Hawk-Dove game, we can
already see some important differences between classic game theory and evo-
lutionary game theory. In many models of classic game theory, such as the
prisoner’s dilemma game and the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, players have
perfect knowledge about the rules and the structure of the game. But in
evolutionary games, players do not have such knowledge. In addition, com-
pared with the smart and rational players in classic game models, players in
evolutionary game theory models normally have bounded rationality. The
strategy of an individual is obtained not by rational choice, but by biological
inheritance.
Furthermore, classic game theory emphasises the analysis of static solu-
tions, such as the Nash Equilibrium, (i.e., a solution under which no player
has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy). In contrast, evo-
lutionary game theory brings more attention to how strategies invade each
other, and it also highlights how individuals change their strategy over time
based on the comparison of payoffs.
1.1.3 Population state
In an infinitely large well mixed population, the state of the population can
be represented by a stochastic vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) with xi ≥ 0 and
x1+x2+· · ·+xn = 1. Each element of x stands for the frequency of a particular
strategy, and n is the total number of strategies. The total frequencies of all
strategies sum up to one. We can therefore denote the set of all states of the
population by ∆n, which a simplex in the n-dimensional real space Rn. It
is convenient to represent low dimensional simplexes geometrically, shown in
Figure 1.1.
In the case where there are three pure strategies, like the Rock-Paper-
Scissors game, in a population in which any individual plays only one pure
strategy, the state of population can be represented in a ∆3 simplex, as illus-
trated in Figure 1.2.
Now we have summarised the state of the population in a stochastic vector,
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 1
 2
 3
 4
Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of some low dimensional simplexes. (i)
∆1 is a point 1 in R1, (ii) ∆2 is a line segment joining (0,1) and (1,0) in R2,
(iii) ∆3 is a equilateral triangle with vertices (0,0,1), (0,1,0) and (1,0,0) in R3,
and (iv) ∆4 is a regular tetrahedron with vertices (0,0,0,1), (0,0,1,0), (0,1,0,
0) and (1,0,0,0) in R4.
and for low dimensional cases, like the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, we can
conveniently plot the state of population on a simplex. In the next step
we study how the state of population changes over time. This brings us to
dynamical models of evolutionary processes.
1.1.4 Deterministic evolutionary dynamics
One great leap from static game theory models to dynamical evolutionary
game theory models is to assume that populations can evolve, in other words,
the relative frequency xi of a strategy i changes over time. From now on,
the state vector x(t) is time-dependent. We use x˙i(t) to denote the speed
at which the frequency of strategy i changes over time. In the deterministic
system, the underlying assumption of differentiability (changes are smooth)
implies that the population size is infinitely large, or xi has to be interpreted
as an expected value, rather than a bona fide frequency [Sigmund, 2011].
A great number of game dynamics have been developed to study the evo-
lutionary outcome of strategy interactions, including the replicator dynamics,
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Rock
ScissorsPaper
a
bc
P
Figure 1.2: Population state represented in a ∆3 Simplex. The coordinates
of P with respect to the three strategies are equivalent to the heights of the
three small triangles of corresponding colours. The sum of the three distances
from P to each of the sides are equal to 1 (a + b + c = 1). In this way, the
frequency of Rock, Paper and Scissors players can be conveniently read from
the figure. The state of the population is (fRock, fPaper, fScissors)=(a,b,c).
the best response dynamics, the payoff projection dynamics and the Brown-
von Neumann-Nash dynamics, etc [Sandholm, 2010]. In general, these game
dynamics assume that strategies with higher payoff do better. The limit-
ing behaviour of them is often a Nash Equilibrium with additional stability
properties [Cressman and Tao, 2014].
Among them the first and most widely used evolutionary dynamics is the
replicator dynamics (Eq.1.4). It is originally defined by Taylor and Jonker
[1978], and Zeeman [1981], and named by Schuster and Sigmund [1983].
x˙i = xi · (fi − 〈f〉) (1.4)
In equation (1.4), fi is the fitness of individuals of the i-th strategy, and 〈f〉 is
the average fitness of all individuals in the population. Assuming that payoff
from game interactions is translated as reproductive fitness, the replicator
dynamics describes the per capita rate of change of the frequency of a strategy
x˙i/xi as equal to the difference between its expected payoff fi and the average
payoff of the population 〈f〉. In other words, if the payoff of a strategy is
higher than the population average, its frequency will increase; if the payoff
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of a strategy is lower than the population average, its frequency will decrease;
if the payoff of a strategy is equal to the population average, the frequency
of it will stay. In addition, the greater the payoff difference, the faster the
speed of the change. Using matrix notation, the replicator equation can also
be written as in Equation (1.5):
x˙i = xi[(Ax)i − x · Ax], (1.5)
in which A is the payoff matrix, and x is the population state vector. The
expected payoff of the i-th strategy is fi = (Ax)i, and the average payoff of
the population is 〈f〉 = x · Ax.
An interesting property of the replicator dynamics is that the simplex ∆n
(including boundaries and the interior) is invariant [Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998; Sigmund, 2010, 2011]. It means that it is possible to find a lower dimen-
sional subset of the simplex, that any trajectory starting from it will stay on
it. This amazing property makes it possible to reduce high dimensional space
to foliated surfaces of lower dimensions. It is easier to study the dynamics in
lower dimensions and then come back to high dimensions by reconstructing
the whole picture. We use this technique both in chapter 2 and chapter 4. Not
only the whole simplex, the interior of the simplex int∆n, is also invariant. It
means that any trajectory starting from the interior of the simplex will stay in
the interior forever, and thus it will never touch the boundary. This brings us
to the other side of the coin. The nice mathematical property of the invariant
of motion may create problems when applied to some biological systems. We
come back to this point later in the next section, when discussing stochastic
evolutionary dynamics [Sigmund, 2011].
Another interesting and important feature of the replicator equation is its
intimate connection with the Lotka-Volterra equation. There exists a mapping
from the n dimensional replicator equation (1.4) to the n − 1 dimensional
Lotka-Volterra equation
y˙i = yi(ri +
n−1∑
j=1
dijyj), (1.6)
in which ri = ain−ann, dij = aij−anj, and aij is the element in the i-th row and
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the j-th column of the game payoff matrix A [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998;
Sigmund, 2011]. In other words, this connection provides a bridge through
which the results about Lotka-Volterra equation and the replicator equation
become interchangeable under certain conditions. But on the other hand,
the replicator equation focuses on relative changes in population sizes under
frequency dependent fitness, while the Lotka-Volterra equation describes pop-
ulations of changing size. The replicator equation is more readily interpreted
in the words of strategy interactions, while the Lotka-Volterra equation is
more naturally explained in ecological terms. Through this link, it is possi-
ble to connect the replicator dynamics with experimental results [Ellner and
Guckenheimer, 2011; May and McLean, 2007; Murray, 2007]. We make use of
this connection in Chapter 4.
Apart from the replicator equation, many other evolutionary dynamics
have been developed to capture different population dynamics scenarios. For
example, the best reply dynamics is another widely used and thoroughly stud-
ied deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. In contrast with the smooth
change of frequencies of strategies through reproduction under the regime
of the replicator dynamics, the best reply dynamics assumes that in a large
population, a small fraction of the very smart players change their strategy,
choosing best replies (not necessarily unique) β(x) to the current mean pop-
ulation strategy x. This produces the best reply dynamics:
x˙ ∈ β(x)− x (1.7)
When applied to human interactions, the best reply dynamics can be in-
terpreted as intelligent players respond optimally. In the biological context,
it has also been interpreted as biological “explorations”, such as mutations
[Sandholm, 2010], although in reality it is unlikely that a mutation happens
to be the best response. As a result, when modelling population dynamics in
biological systems, the application of the best reply dynamics is much more
limited, compared with the widely used replication dynamics. In Figure 1.3
we show that under the same game (implying the same Nash Equilibria), the
paths that population state follows can be very different, under different types
of population dynamics.
12 Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1.3: The same Rock-Paper-Scissors game under different dynamics.
We use the payoff matrix as in Equation 1.2 with a = 1 and b = 2. Because
the game is totally symmetric, it does not matter which strategy is on which
vertex. The underlying population dynamics are the replicator dynamics (left
panel) and the best response dynamics (right panel). This figure is produced
using the Dynamo package [Sandholm et al., 2012].
1.1.5 Stochastic evolutionary dynamics
In section 1.1.4 we introduced some interesting mathematical properties of
the replicator dynamics. Among them we mentioned that the interior of the
population state simplex is invariant. On one hand, this property provides
great convenience in mathematical analysis, but on the other hand, it also
implies that if a strategy is present in the population, it will be present for-
ever. The frequency of it may decrease to extremely low but never hit zero.
Therefore extinction is not possible. This is obviously not true in real biologi-
cal populations. This example shows us that not all results obtained from the
deterministic evolutionary dynamics can be transferred directly to population
with finite size.
Although deterministic evolutionary dynamics has many beautiful math-
ematical properties and it describes population dynamics in very large pop-
ulations quite well, there is no guarantee that it still provides good approx-
imations in biological systems that are subject to substantial fluctuations in
population size. Therefore we continue to explore the role of internal noise and
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randomness arising from the limited size of populations under stochastic evo-
lutionary dynamics. This modelling framework provides a way to circumvent
the “problem of no extinction” by acknowledging the finite size of populations.
Now it is possible to ask questions about the evolutionary fate of mutants. For
example, one could ask the probability that a mutant spreads and eventually
takes over the whole population, or the probability that it goes extinct. In this
introduction of the thesis, only the concepts that are used later in Chapter
3 and a few other indispensable ones are introduced to facilitate understand-
ing. A comprehensive introduction to stochastic evolutionary dynamics can
be found in the book chapter of Traulsen and Hauert [2009].
In stochastic evolutionary dynamics models it is essential to specify the
microscopic mechanisms of strategy transmission. Strategies are most com-
monly transmitted through reproduction or social learning. Two commonly
used stochastic processes of strategy transmission via reproduction are the
Moran process [Moran, 1958] and the Wright-Fisher process [Fisher, 1930;
Wright, 1931]. Both of them have deep roots in population genetics [Ewens,
2004].
The Moran process has been transferred to evolutionary game theory to
model strategy dynamics in populations of overlapping generations [Nowak
et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004]. In each time step, one individual gives birth
by introducing a copy of itself into the population, followed by the death of a
random individual except the newborn to keep population size constant. In
this simple birth-death process, the picking of an individual for reproduction
is at random, but proportional to the fitness of the individual’s reproductive
fitness. In the context of evolutionary games, fitness (f) is translated from
the payoffs (pi) from strategy interactions. For example, this could be through
a linear function, e.g. f = 1 − ω + ωpi, as in Nowak et al. [2004], or through
an exponential function, i.e. f = exp[ωpi], as in Traulsen et al. [2008].
In both mapping functions, ω denotes the intensity of selection. This
parameter adjusts the relative importance of selection and random drift in
evolutionary processes. Assume that the fitness of the wild type is one, and
the fitness of the mutant is f . In the case where ω = 0, for both mapping
functions, f takes the value of one. It means that in this case, selection is
absent, and population dynamics is driven by random drift alone. For the
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linear mapping function, ω has to have an upper bound. This is to make sure
that fitness to be nonnegative so that it is biologically meaningful. For the
exponential mapping function, ω can take any positive value. An important
case is when ω  1, meaning that all individuals perform approximately
equally well. In this case, selection has an effect, but random drift plays the
most important role in population dynamics. This scenario is called “weak
selection".
Weak selection is a widely used assumption in population genetics. It
has also been introduced to evolutionary game theory in the seminal work
of Nowak et al. [2004]. Many interesting and important results have been
derived under weak selection approximations, with the help of perturbation
analysis [Ewens, 2004], such as the change of linkage disequilibrium under
weak epistasis [Hastings, 1985], effects of random drift and selection against
heterozygotes across a genetic barrier [Pialek and Barton, 1997], and the evo-
lutionary dynamics on graphs [Fu et al., 2009]. Empirical studies also show
that most mutations have very small fitness consequences [Eyre-Walker and
Keightley, 2007]. Although the assumption of weak selection is mostly for
mathematical convenience, it can be applied appropriately to some biological
circumstances.
Even when selection is not weak, results derived under the weak selection
approximation can still be insightful in some cases. For example, in popu-
lations of infinite size, changing the intensity of selection only results in a
rescaling of time, and thus it does not affect the outcome of evolutionary dy-
namics [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2005]. But it is also
important to note that in finite populations, the long-term evolutionary out-
come obtained under weak selection often cannot be transferred directly to
the case of arbitrary intensity of selection, especially when the number of
strategies are large [Wu et al., 2013]. In chapter 3, we study the pattern of
fixation probability of a mutant in age structured populations of finite size
and fixed demographic structure. In order to keep generality of the results,
we calculated the fixation probability numerically, without making the weak
selection approximation. But it is a natural approach to obtain more analyt-
ical insights when extending the model to the case of multiple age classes in
the future.
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1.1.6 Games in bacterial worlds
Bacterial populations are great systems for applying evolutionary game theory
to study the origin and maintenance of biodiversity [Czaran et al., 2002; Dur-
rett and Levin, 1997, 1998; Franzenburg et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2002; Xavier
et al., 2009] and cooperation [Chuang et al., 2009; Gore et al., 2009; Greig and
Travisano, 2004; Nadell et al., 2008; Xavier and Foster, 2007]. Compared to
large organisms like animals and plants, bacteria have much shorter genera-
tion times and larger population sizes, making it convenient for experimental
manipulations and quantifications. In addition, the dynamics of bacterial pop-
ulations display patterns that are also observed in populations of animals and
plants, such as the cyclic fluctuations of species frequencies. These patterns
can be influenced by many common factors that affect population dynamics of
large organisms, too. For example, the spatial and demographic structures of
the population, the dispersal of individuals, frequency or density dependent
fitness, to name a few. Therefore it is worthwhile to use bacterial popula-
tions as model systems for studying and testing ecological and evolutionary
theories.
A recent comprehensive review of games in bacterial populations can be
found in the book chapter by Frey and Reichenbach [2011], where the authors
covered both deterministic and stochastic models integrated with empirical
studies. Here we only introduce the necessary background for chapter 4 and
chapter 5, focusing on the role of frequency and density dependent interactions
on the maintenance of biodiversity.
Negative frequency dependent selection is an important mechanism of the
maintenance of biodiversity. One way that produces negative frequency de-
pendent reproductive fitness for different phenotypes or different species is
through cyclic dominance, like the three strategies in the Rock-Paper-Scissors
game, which was introduced in section 1.1.1, and its basic population dynam-
ics behaviour under the replicator dynamics and the best response dynamics
have been shown in figure 1.3 of section 1.1.4.
Cyclic dominance of strategies have also been known as non-transitive
competition [Kerr et al., 2002] and non-hierarchical competition [Frey and
Reichenbach, 2011]. In cyclic dominance, each type (e.g. phenotype, species,
strategy) outperform another, but is also itself outperformed by a different
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one. This relationship has been found in many ecosystems, including coral reef
invertebrates [Buss and Jackson, 1979; Jackson and Buss, 1975], male lizards
in the inner Coast Range of California [Sinervo and Lively, 1996], rodents
in the high-Arctic tundra in Greenland [Gilg et al., 2003], and in microbial
systems, such as different strains of E. coli [Kerr et al., 2002; Kirkup and
Riley, 2004] and yeast [Paquin and Adams, 1983].
In the E. coli system of [Kerr et al., 2002], there are three different strains.
One of them is able to produce a toxin called Colicin E2 that acts as a DNA
endonuclease. The toxin producing strain (C) kills the sensitive strain (S),
which grows faster than the toxin resistant strain (R), because it is costly to
produce the immune protein which protects R cells against the toxin. And
the R strain grows faster than the C strain, because it involves extra cost
to produce the toxin. As a result, the three strains of E. coli cyclicly domi-
nate and being dominated by each other, resembling the Rock-Papaer-Scissors
game. In experiments the authors found that limited dispersal and spatially
localised interactions are necessary for the coexistence of the three strains.
This is consistent with theoretical predictions [Durrett and Levin, 1997; Pagie
and Hogeweg, 1999].
Beyond the artificial E. coli populations on a Petri dish, the epithelial sur-
faces of most animals are colonised by diverse microbial communities, which
serve many beneficial functions, including pathogen control [Buffie et al., 2012;
Fraune et al., 2014; Kamada et al., 2013]. In addition, quantitative studies
have shown that the composition of bacterial communities during establish-
ment in neonatal animals are dynamic and complex, but at the same time fol-
low reliable temporal patterns [Franzenburg et al., 2013; Palmer et al., 2007].
However, knowledges about the processes controlling community membership
and influencing the establishment of the microbial ecosystem during devel-
opment are still very limited. In the work of Franzenburg et al. [2013], the
temporal pattern that the frequency of the most abundant bacterial species
in the stable adult microbiota rises in the beginning or colonisation, and then
goes through a large decline rapidly, and then grows up again steadily to a
stable dominance. This pattern was captured by the replicator-mutator equa-
tion,
x˙i = xi
(
fi − f¯
)
+ λ(t)
(
f¯ ri
n− 1 − xifi
)
, (1.8)
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where the first term describes changes due to fitness difference with population
average, and the second term describes random gain or lose because of all other
types proportional to the rate of colonisation.
Although the replicator-mutator equation describes the observed pattern
and proposes a tentative mechanism that could produce such pattern, it does
provide detailed information or hypotheses on the microscopic interactions
among bacterial cells. It also does not include the influence of population size
fluctuation nor density dependent effects. In chapter 4, we integrate both ex-
perimental and modelling approaches to investigate the competition dynamics
of the two most abundant bacterial species in vitro. In experiments, we find
that the growth rates of the two interacting bacterial species are frequency
dependent. Using mathematical modelling, we show that the frequency de-
pendent growth rates can produce the complex population dynamics patterns
observed in the experiments. As a followup, in Chapter 5, we ask what are
the mechanisms producing such frequency dependent growth rates. Further-
more, we also try to find out the underlying mechanisms behind the role of
Curvibacter sp. as a keystone species in the Hydra microbiota.
1.2 Life History Theory
Life history theory aims to understand the causes and consequences of genetic
and environmental variation in life history traits, both within and among
species [Flatt and Heyland, 2011]. Historically it has had major successes in
explaining the diversity of life history strategies as a result of natural selection,
as reviewed comprehensively in the books by Roff [1992] and Stearns [1992].
There are seven most important traits that characterise the life history of a
species in classic life history analysis: (1) size at birth, (2) growth pattern, (3)
age and size at maturity, (4) number, size, and sex ratio of offspring, (5) age-
and size-specific reproductive investment, (6) age-and size-specific mortality
schedules, and (7) the length of life [Stearns, 1992]. Taken together in the light
of evolution, these life history traits determine Darwinian fitness through two
most important fitness components – reproduction and survival.
The idea of tradeoff is a central concept in life history theory. Organisms
normally face limited resources, which must be competitively allocated to
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different functions, such as growth, reproduction, survival and maintenance.
Resources invested into one function can hardly be used also for another, lead-
ing to tradeoffs. In the case where selection works on both reproduction and
survival, different functions of resource allocation can lead to huge differences
in the fixation probability of a mutant, in age structured populations. We
study this and evaluate the differences between selecting on reproduction and
survival in Chapter 3.
One important feature of models in life history theory is that they allow
growth in population size. This is in sharp contrast with evolutionary game
models that put more emphasis on the dynamical changes of the frequencies
of different strategies. The exponential population growth model (Eq. 1.9) is
the simplest and most basic population growth model, in which N(t) is the
number of individuals in the population (or population density, the number of
individuals per unit space) at time t, and r is the growth rate of the population.
N(t) = N(0) · ert (1.9)
When r > 0, the exponential population growth model produces the result
that the size of population will increase exponentially to infinitely large, which
is unrealistic. In the book of Anderson and May [1992], the authors explain
this problem by comparing it elegantly with Newton’s first law of motion:
“A body remains in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight
line, unless acted on by external forces.”
Similarly, in real biological populations, growth cannot go on forever, because
the rates of birth and death will change over time. To use the words of
Anderson and May [1992],
“A closed population of self-reproducing entities – such as viruses,
cells, animals or plants – will grow or decay exponentially at a
constant rate, unless a change in conditions alters the per entity
birth or death rate.”
This shows that the rates of birth and death are of fundamental importance
in describing and predicting population dynamics. Therefore, they are called
vital rates of the population. The values of these vital rates can be affected
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by many factors including frequency and density dependent effects through
interactions, as discussed in the previous section. From the genetics and
physiological perspective, they can also depend on the age or life stages of the
individuals, especially for species with overlapping generations (e.g. humans)
and for species with very different stages of life (e.g. insects). This leads us
to age and life stage structured population models.
1.2.1 Age structured populations models
The most convenient and widely used way of expressing an age-structured
population model is by matrix notation. A typical age structured population
model as shown in (1.10) is called a Leslie matrix model, named after British
ecologist Patrick H. Leslie who popularised age structured models for animal
populations [Leslie, 1945, 1948].
n0
n1
n2
n3
...
nν−1

t+1
=

f0 f1 f2 . . . fν−2 fν−1
s0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 s1 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 s2 . . . 0 0
...
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . sν−2 0

·

n0
n1
n2
n3
...
nν−1

t
(1.10)
We use nt+1 = Lnt as a shorthand of equation (1.10), in which L is called
the Leslie matrix, or population projection matrix. At each time point, the
population is represented by a vector n with one element for each age class.
Each of the elements represents the number of individuals in that age class.
The top row of the matrix contains the fecundity of individuals in each of the
age classes. The subdiagonal contains probability that an individual in the
current age class survives to the next age class.
The Leslie matrix model has a regular form and straight forward interpre-
tations for each of the parameters. In addition, it also has many convenient
mathematical properties, which will be introduced later in section 1.2.3. But
sometimes it can encounter difficulties, when applied to modelling real bio-
logical populations. The first difficulty comes when one has to determine the
unit of age for the species under study. Should it be a day, a year or ten years?
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It can be hard to justify such particular choices.
The second difficulty is the tradeoff between model error and parameter
error [Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2011]. Model errors are made due to incor-
rect assumptions. In such age structured population model, it is usually due
to an oversimplification of reality. This type of errors can thus be reduced
by making the model more complex, e.g., using smaller unit of age and more
age classes. But inevitably, parameter error goes up because one needs to
estimate more parameter values from the same amount of data. One way
of circumventing such difficult tradeoff is to use another type of model that
censuses individuals not by their ages, but by life stages. This leads us to the
life stage structured population models.
1.2.2 Life stage structured population models
Apart from age, individuals can also be classified by their stage in the life cycle.
For example, it is natural to make such classifications for insects, which have
distinct larva, pupa and adult stages. Even for species that have more gradual
courses of life history, it can still be desirable to classify the individuals into
a few groups according to certain measurable features, such as size or body
weight. These features are usually much easier to obtain compared to the age
for non-human species. In addition, they often provide the best information
for predicting fecundity and probability of survival towards the next period
of time. For example, the size, rather than the age of many organisms (i.e.,
trees, sea turtles, desert tortoise, geese, corals and fish, etc. [Caswell, 2001]),
is generally better in predicting the growth, fecundity and mortality.
The life stage structured population models can also be written in the
matrix form nt+1 = Ant, in which A is the population projection matrix.
The form is very similar to the Leslie matrix model introduced in the previous
section, but with very different meanings.
In age structured models, an individual has to either die or move to the
next age class in one step of time. But in stage structured models, an indi-
vidual can move forwards to later stage classes, or move backwards to earlier
stage classes, or stay in the same stage class. In fact, in stage structured
models, there essentially is no difference between “survival” and “reproduc-
tion”, analogically in the words of age structured models. This is because, for
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the population, it does not matter if a small individual is a new born or an
older individual who shrank back down to the newborn size. At the level of
the population, the number of individuals in each of the stage classes provides
complete information about its future prospects, and it does not matter where
and how each of the individuals comes from.
As a natural consequence, the shapes of the projection matrices are also
different in age and stage structured models. In the Leslie matrix L, non-zero
entries can only be found in the first row (representing reproduction) and the
subdiagonal (representing the probability of survival). But for the projection
matrix A in the stage structured population model, in principle, non-zero
entries can be found anywhere. In particular, the elements on the diagonal
are almost always non-zeros.
1.2.3 Useful mathematical properties of matrix popula-
tion models
Matrix population models provide convenience for mathematical analyses. A
pedagogical introduction and detailed derivations and explanations can be
found in the classic textbook of Caswell [2001]. More rigorous analysis can
be found in the book of Charlesworth et al. [1994]. Here we only list the
properties that are used in, or provide important background for Chapter 3.
Given the population projection matrix A, and initial population state
vector n(0), the general solution is
n(t) = Atn(0). (1.11)
The long term behaviour of the population is determined by the dominant
right eigenvalue λ1 of the projection matrix, and its corresponding eigenvector
w1:
n(t)→ c1λt1w1, (1.12)
where c1 is the coefficient that satisfies n(0) =
ν∑
i
ciwi, in which ν is the
number of age/stage classes, and wi is the corresponding eigenvector for the
eigenvalue λi. The symbol ‘→’ means that as t → ∞, the relative error goes
to zero. This tells us that in the long run, the total population size grows
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exponentially at rate λ1, and the population vector becomes proportional to
w1. This is called the stable age/stage distribution of the population.
Analogous to that for the right eigenvalues and eigenvectors, there are left
eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the projection matrix A that satisfy vA = λv,
where v is a row vector. The dominant left eigenvector v1 has a biological
interpretation as the “reproductive value” of different ages/stages. The repro-
ductive value of an individual was originally defined by Fisher [1930] as “to
what extent will persons of this age (or sex), on average, contribute to the
ancestry of future generations". It does so by accounting for the remaining
number of offspring he or she will produce discounted by the increase of popu-
lation size at the time of reproduction of these offspring. More comprehensive
explanations and examples are beautifully presented in the books of Caswell
[2001] and Houston and McNamara [1999].
1.3 Towards the symbiosis between games and
life history
Evolutionary game theory introduced in section 1.1 and life history theory
introduced in section 1.2 are widely used approaches to modelling of evolu-
tionary processes. However, in classic evolutionary game theory models there
is no population demographic structure. The fluctuations in population size
are often ignored, too. Life history theory provides a natural and powerful
way of studying the demographic structure and size fluctuations of biological
populations. But typical approaches take no account of the interactions in the
population, relying solely on optimising a set of life history traits to maximise
reproductive success. The advantages of the two established theories have
the potential to compensate the shortcomings of each other, but a theoretical
framework that integrates the two is still missing.
The major goals of the thesis are (1) to build a theoretical framework
connecting these two fields , and (2) to apply evolutionary game theory for
studying the population dynamics and interactions in real biological systems.
Starting from Chapter 2, we first study the replicator dynamics of evolu-
tionary game interactions in stage structured populations. Game interactions
and the demographic structure of biological populations are connected through
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“life stage dependent strategies”, which is the most important innovation in
this work. With life stage dependent strategies, we are able to study the pop-
ulation dynamics in the novel cases, where the behaviour of an individual is
conditioned on its opponent’s life stage, or conditioned on the matching of
the life stages of the two. Although these cases are natural in real biological
settings, they have not been studied before.
Although accounted for population demographic structure, our model in
Chapter 2 did not consider the role of random fluctuations caused by the finite
size of real biological populations. We approach this in Chapter 3, building
a stochastic model of strategy dynamics in age structured populations. The
detailed stochastic processes embedded in the model allow us to evaluate
the effects of different targets of selective forces. We show that selecting
on reproduction and survival are fundamentally different in age structured
populations, which has not been shown in existing theoretical models.
While taking into account both the effects of population demographic
structure and size, one limitation of our work in Chapter 3 is that it as-
sumes that the selection is constant, and population size is fixed. Although
the assumptions provide convenience for mathematical analyses, they may not
be able to capture important features of biological processes. Combining both
theory and experiments, we show in Chapter 4 that in bacterial populations,
frequency dependent fitness and the growth of population sizes can lead to
complex pattern of multiple coexisting states of the population. In order to
find out the underlying mechanism of the frequency dependency of growth
rates, especially the mechanisms behind the role of Curvibacter sp. as a key-
stone species in the natural microbiota of Hydra, we continue our exploration
in Chapter 5, in which we postulate that the infection and cross-infection of
bacterial phages can provide a way that leads to frequency dependent fitness
of bacterial hosts.

Chapter 2
Modeling evolutionary games in
populations with demographic
structure
Evolutionary game theory naturally captures the effects of frequency depen-
dent selection, providing a useful framework for studying the evolution of
strategic interactions. However, classic evolutionary game models often ne-
glect the life history traits of individuals in the population. This chapter is
a first attempt to integrate life history factors into evolutionary game mod-
els. We start from defining life-stage dependent strategies by combining basic
strategic behaviours with the life history features of individuals in the popu-
lation. The strategic behaviours of an individual can be conditioned on the
current life-stage of itself, or that of the opponent, or the matching of life
stages between the two players. We write down the payoff matrices of the
interactions between different life-stage dependent strategies, and we study
the deterministic replicator dynamics of strategy interactions.
This chapter is based on the publication of Xiang-Yi Li, Stefano Giaimo,
Annette Baudisch, and Arne Traulsen with the same title on the Journal of
Theoretical Biology 380 (2015): 506-515 [Li et al., 2015a]. A detailed summary
of the authors’ contributions to this publication can be found at the end of
this thesis.
2.1 Abstract
Classic life history models are often based on optimization algorithms, focus-
ing on the adaptation of survival and reproduction to the environment, while
neglecting frequency dependent interactions in the population. Evolutionary
26
Chapter 2. Modeling evolutionary games in populations with
demographic structure
game theory, on the other hand, studies frequency dependent strategy inter-
actions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the
population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially
alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynam-
ics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals
have two basic strategic behaviours, interacting in pairwise games. A player
may condition behaviour on the life stage of its own, or that of the opponent,
or the matching of life stages between both players. A strategy is thus defined
as the set of rules that determines a player’s life stage dependent behaviours.
We show that the diversity of life stage structures and life stage dependent
strategies can promote each other, and the stable frequency of basic strategic
behaviours can deviate from game equilibrium in populations with life stage
structures.
We integrate
Basic strategic 
behaviours
Population 
demographic 
structures
Life-stage 
dependent 
strategies
Behaviours condition on
Life stage 
of the Opponent
Matching of life stages 
between two players
Focal player
We use
Payoff Matrix
Replicator 
dynamics
We study frequency dependent strategy interactions in populations 
with homogeneous and heterogeneous demographic structures
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2.2 Introduction
The evolution of life history traits is of central importance in evolutionary
theory. Classic life history theory models often use optimization arguments,
focusing on how environmental conditions shape survival and reproduction,
and how life history traits affect each other [Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992, 2000].
But the fitness landscapes of evolving populations are often not static, rather
constantly changed by the phenotypic dynamics of the interacting popula-
tions [Nowak and Sigmund, 2004]. Therefore, it is necessary to also consider
the density and frequency dependent aspects in studying the evolution of life
history. Effects of density dynamics on life history evolution have been stud-
ied thoroughly [Abrams, 1993; Hastings, 1997; Higgins et al., 1997; Williams
and Day, 2003], with recent advancements in particular under the framework
of adaptive dynamics [Ernande and Dieckmann, 2004; Ernande et al., 2004;
Marty et al., 2011; Meszéna et al., 2001; Metz et al., 1996; Miethe et al., 2009].
Evolutionary Game Theory [Broom and Rychtář, 2013; Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a] provides a natural framework that includes fre-
quency dependent selection for modeling evolution in the phenotypic space.
But classic evolutionary game theory models often study populations in which
an individual’s strategic behaviour keeps fixed over the entire life time [Cress-
man, 1992]. This is largely due to the fact that demographic structure of
the population is typically not taken into consideration [for rare exceptions,
see Argasinski and Broom, 2013; Cressman, 2003; Day and Taylor, 1996]. By
integrating evolutionary game dynamics and life history theory, here we study
the interplay of the two fundamental aspects of evolutionary processes. We
show that a more intricate dynamics is produced when both aspects are taken
into consideration [McNamara, 2013].
In a population where individuals differ in life stages, it is natural that
the strategic behaviour can vary accordingly. Since behavioural changes may
not necessarily depend on age [Groenendael et al., 1988], here we adopt the
idea of a life stage based model [Caswell, 2001]. For simplicity, we assume
that individuals only have two life stages, young and senescent. In addition,
we assume that compared to the dynamics of strategic interactions (which
is determined by biological reproduction in evolutionary game theory), the
update of demographic structure (which reflects chronological ageing) is fast
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and thus typically in equilibrium. Therefore, the proportions of young and
senescent individuals are constant for each strategic group. These proportions
correspond to the elements of the appropriately normalized right eigenvector,
corresponding to the leading eigenvalue, of the population projection matrix
that contains the vital rates of the relevant group. This vector is proportional
to the stable stage distribution of the population [Caswell, 2001]. It should
be noted that we have adopted the terminology “young" and “senescent" to
suggest that the two stages through which individuals transition can often
be interpreted as ages. However, one should keep in mind that our models
can be interpreted as composed of two age classes only in cases where the
proportion of young individuals is greater than one-half. This is a prerequisite
for sustaining population size in the long term.
The replicator equations describe deterministic strategy dynamics in in-
finitely large, well-mixed populations, serving as the starting point and most
standard approach for studying evolutionary game interactions [Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998; Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Zeeman, 1980]. As a first step of
integrating life history structures into evolutionary game dynamics, we start
from the very basic and choose the replicator dynamics as the underlying
mechanism of strategy updates.
In populations with no demographic structure, a two-player evolutionary
game with two strategic behaviours, A and B can be written in the form of a
payoff matrix.
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
(2.1)
Individuals meet randomly and interact in pairs. If both players play the A
strategy, each of them receives a payoff of a. If one player plays the A strategy
and the other plays the B strategy, the A strategy player receives a payoff of
b, and the B strategy player receives a payoff of c. If both players play the B
strategy, they both receive a payoff of d.
If individuals have distinct young and senescent life stages in the popula-
tion, their behaviours can be conditioned on the focal player’s life stage, the
opponent’s life stage, or the matching of life stages between the two players.
In the following, we study these cases separately.
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2.3 Behaviour conditioned on the player’s own
life stage
2.3.1 Payoff matrix
In a population where individuals have young and senescent life stages and two
strategic behaviour options, there can be four different life-stage dependent
strategies: always play A (AA), play A when young but play B when senescent
(AB), play B when young but play A when senescent (BA), and always play
B (BB), if an individual’s behaviour is determined by its current life stage.
In the following we denote the proportions of young individuals in the four
strategic subpopulations as pAA, pBA, pAB, and pBB, respectively.
If population demography is fixed, pAA, pBA, pAB and pBB are constant. Since
individuals condition behaviours on their own life stages, the demographic
substructures of AA and BB individuals do not matter, because these in-
dividuals behave in the same way all the time. Therefore the values of pAA
and pBB do not appear in the payoff matrix here. Only pBA and pAB affect an
individual’s payoff.
Now the average payoff for each pair of strategy interactions can be cal-
culated. For example, the average payoff of an AB individual playing against
a BA individual is pBApABb+ pBAqABa+ qBApABd+ qBAqABc, where qBA = 1− pBA and
qAB = 1− pAB are frequencies of senescent individuals in the AB and BA sub-
populations. In this way, the payoff matrix M of all pairwise interactions can
be written as

AA AB BA BB
AA a pBAa+ q
B
Ab p
A
Bb+ q
A
Ba b
AB pBAa+ q
B
Ac (p
B
A)
2a+ pBAq
B
A (b+ c) + (q
B
A )
2d pBAp
A
Bb+ p
B
Aq
A
Ba+ q
B
Ap
A
Bd+ q
B
Aq
A
Bc p
B
Ab+ q
B
Ad
BA pABc+ q
A
Ba p
A
Bp
B
Ac+ p
A
Bq
B
Ad+ q
A
Bp
B
Aa+ q
A
Bq
B
Ab (p
A
B)
2d+ pABq
A
B(b+ c) + (q
A
B)
2a pABd+ q
A
Bb
BB c pBAc+ q
B
Ad p
A
Bd+ q
A
Bc d

(2.2)
2.3.2 Homogeneous life history
In the special cases where the demographic structures in AB and BA sub-
populations are identical, namely, pBA = pAB = p, the payoff matrix M can be
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simplified to Mp.
Mp =

AA AB BA BB
AA a pa+ qb pb+ qa b
AB pa+ qc p2a+ pq(b+ c) + q2d p2b+ pq(a+ d) + q2c pb+ qd
BA pc+ qa p2c+ pq(a+ d) + q2b p2d+ pq(b+ c) + q2a pd+ qb
BB c pc+ qd pd+ qc d

(2.3)
In the following, we denote the frequencies of AA, AB, BA and BB as xAA, xBA,
xAB and xBB. Let x = (xAA, xBA, xAB, xBB)T denote the population state vector, the
average payoff of the four strategies is (piAA, piBA , piAB, piBB)T = Mp ·x. We denote
the average payoff the population as 〈pi〉 = xTMpx; the replicator equation
describing the frequency dynamics of the four strategies is
x˙ji = x
j
i · (piji − 〈pi〉) (2.4)
With fixed population demography for AB and BA strategies, the replicator
dynamics of the four strategies can be represented in the S4 simplex. As it is
difficult to visualize this three-dimensional object, we only illustrate the four
surfaces of the simplex for a coexistence game in Figure 2.1a.
For the payoff matrix Mp, we find (Mpx)1 + (Mpx)4 = (Mpx)2 + (Mpx)3.
Therefore we can define a function V = xAAxBB/xBAxAB, which satisfies
V˙ = V [(Mpx)1 + (Mpx)4 − (Mpx)2 − (Mpx)3] = 0 (2.5)
In the interior of S4, V is an invariant of motion - the value V0 of the initial
condition is always preserved [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010].
For any positive V0, the interior of S4 is foliated by the surface WV0 given by
xAAx
B
B = V0x
B
Ax
A
B, as shown in Figure 2.1b-c.
2.3.3 Heterogeneous life history
Now we study the more general situations where not all strategies have the
same proportion of young individuals, i.e. the original payoff matrix M . If
individuals condition behaviour on their own life stages, there is a surface of
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Figure 2.1: (a) Replicator dynamics of a coexistence game on the surface of
a S4 simplex. Game parameters are a = −1/3, b = 1, c = 0, d = 1/2. The
proportion of young individuals in the population is p = 2/3, identical for
all strategies. This figure is produced using the Dynamo package [Sandholm
et al., 2012]. (b) The saddle-like surface WV0 given by the solution of xAAxBB =
V0x
B
Ax
A
B (V0 = 1) spanned by the edges AA−AB−BB−BA−AA of the S4
simplex. The orange surface connected by the four stable fixed points on the
edges is a plane of fixed points inside and on the faces of the simplex. (c) The
dynamics on the surface WV0 in (b). Besides the boundary fixed points shown
by red circles, all points satisfying xAA + xAB =
9
5
− 2(xAA + xBA) are equilibria in
the interior of the Simplex (red dotted line, which is the intersect of the two
surfaces in (b)).
solutions in the S4 simplex (Figure 2.2a):
xA = x
A
A + p
B
Ax
B
A + (1− pAB)xAB =
d− b
a− b− c+ d (2.6)
Therefore, regardless of the values of pBA and pAB, the global frequency of A
behaviour xA always converges to the intermediate fixed point in a coexistence
game, as shown in Figure 2.2b.
If individuals condition their behaviour on their own life stages, there can
be more complex conditional strategies coexisting in the population, but the
frequency of basic strategic behaviour always converges to the game equilib-
rium. This holds even if different strategies have different life history, suggest-
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Figure 2.2: The surface of fixed points changes with the change of population
demographic structures. But the global frequency of A behaviour always
converges to game equilibrium. (a) The surface of fixed points changes with
varying pBA. Game parameters and the value of pAB are identical with those in
Figure 2.1. (b) Starting from any initial frequency between 0 and 1, the global
frequency of A behaviour converges to the intermediate game equilibrium.
Trajectories of different colours correspond to different values of pBA in (a).
ing that neutral evolution may play an important role in life history evolution
under frequency dependence. The diversity of life history can be promoted
through strategic interactions, and the diversity of strategies can be promoted
through life history.
2.4 Behaviour conditioned on the opponent’s
life stage
2.4.1 Payoff matrix
In contrast to the previous case, in which an individual’s behaviour is con-
ditioned on its own life stage, one can also condition its behaviour on the
opponent’s life stage. If an individual senses the life stage of its game op-
ponent and behaves accordingly, there can be four different strategies: play
A with everyone (AA), play A if the opponent is young but play B if the
opponent is senescent (AB), play B if the opponent is young but play A if the
opponent is senescent (BA), and play B with everyone (BB). We continue
to denote the proportions of young individuals in the four subpopulations as
pAA, pBA, pAB, and pBB, respectively. The payoff matrix M˜ for pairwise strategy
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interactions can be written as

AA AB BA BB
AA a pAAa+ q
A
Ab p
A
Ab+ q
A
Aa b
AB pAAa+ q
A
Ac (p
B
A)
2a+ pBAq
B
A (b+ c) + (q
B
A )
2d pBAp
A
Bb+ p
B
Aq
A
Bd+ q
B
Ap
A
Ba+ q
B
Aq
A
Bc p
B
Bb+ q
B
Bd
BA pAAc+ q
A
Aa p
A
Bp
B
Ac+ p
A
Bq
B
Aa+ q
A
Bp
B
Ad+ q
A
Bq
B
Ab (p
A
B)
2d+ pABq
A
B(b+ c) + (q
A
B)
2a pBBd+ q
B
Bb
BB c pBBc+ q
B
Bd p
B
Bd+ q
B
Bc d

(2.7)
2.4.2 Homogeneous life history
If demographic structures are the same for all strategic subpopulations, pAA =
pBA = p
A
B = p
B
B = p, the payoff matrix M˜ becomes identical to Mp, and the
replicator dynamics is the same as discussed in section 2.2.
Therefore, in a population where each strategy has the same demographic
structure, the interaction dynamics are identical no matter if the behaviours
are conditioned on the focal player’s life stage, or that of the opponent in
pairwise games. One has to examine the microscopic interactions in order to
distinguish the two cases.
2.4.3 Heterogeneous life history–an example in a Hawk-
Dove game
If the proportion of young individuals in one of the strategies becomes differ-
ent from the others, extinction of one or more strategies can happen, and the
global frequency of basic behaviours thereby can diverge from game equilib-
rium. This is different from the “all-coexist" situation that takes place when
behaviour is conditioned on the player’s own life stage. In the following, we
illustrate this point in a particular coexistence game, the Hawk-Dove game.
In a Hawk-Dove game, two players are involved in a conflict over a valuable
resource, but the cost of fighting is greater than the value of the resource. We
assume the value of resource is 1, the cost of fighting is n > 1. If a Hawk
meets another Hawk, they fight for the resource and the average payoff for
each of them is half of the value reduced by half of the cost of conflict. If
a Hawk meets a Dove, the Dove flees to avoid conflict, so that the Hawk
gets the whole resource without a fight, and the Dove receives nothing. If
34
Chapter 2. Modeling evolutionary games in populations with
demographic structure
two Doves meet, they share the resource peacefully. In a population without
demographic structure, the payoff matrix can be written as
( Hawk Dove
Hawk (1− n)/2 1
Dove 0 1/2
)
(2.8)
The frequency of Hawk behaviour in equilibrium is 1/n.
However, in a population with young and senescent life stages, players can
condition their behaviours on the life stage of the opponent. In this way, there
are again four different strategies in the population. If an individual behaves
aggressive to both young and senescent opponents, its strategy is denoted
as HH. If an individual behaves aggressive towards a young opponent but
behaves peacefully when it meets a senescent opponent, its strategy is denoted
as HD. If an individual does the opposite by behaving peacefully when facing
a young opponent but being aggressive in front of a senescent opponent, its
strategy is denoted as DH. If an individual behaves peacefully in any case,
its strategy is denoted as DD.
If the proportion of young individuals of the four strategies are identical
and constant, denoted as p, the four strategies can all coexist in a variety of
states where the frequency of Hawk behaviour xH = xHH + pxDH + (1− p)xHD is
always at game equilibrium 1/n as if demographic structure is absent. This
has been discussed above. However, if one of the strategies has a different life-
stage structure, starting from the presence of all four strategies, extinction of
one or more strategies can happen, and the frequency of Hawk behaviour can
diverge from game equilibrium.
For example, assume only pHH , the proportion of young individuals in the
HH subpopulation is different from that of other strategies, which is denoted
as p. The payoff matrix becomes

HH HD DH DD
HH 1−n
2
1− (n+1)pHH
2
1−n+(n+1)pHH
2
1
HD
(1−n)pHH
2
p2(1−np2)
2
p(1− n(1−p)
2
) 1+p
2
DH
(n−1)(pHH−1)
2
(p−1)(np−2)
2
1−n(p−1)2
2
1− p
2
DD 0 1−p
2
p
2
1
2
 (2.9)
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Figure 2.3: Stability of the fixed points x∗ and x∗∗ switches. In both sides,
game parameter n = 3, the proportion of young individuals in the HD, DH
and DD strategy subpopulations are p = 0.5. In (a), the proportion of young
individuals in the HH strategy is pHH = 0.3, in (b), pHH = 0.7. When pHH < p,
x∗ is stable and x∗∗ is unstable. When pHH > p, x∗ is unstable and x∗∗ is stable.
Figures are produced using the Dynamo package [Sandholm et al., 2012].
We study the interactions of the four strategies in the simplex S4 using
the replicator dynamics. When pHH 6= p, the internal fixed point where all the
four strategies coexist disappears. All fixed points are on the surface of the
simplex. One, two or three strategies can coexist at the fixed points. Two
interesting fixed points are the one where HH-HD-DD coexist, denoted as
x∗, and the one where HH-DH-DD coexist, denoted as x∗∗ in the following.
Within the regime where the cost of conflict is relatively large, n > 1−p
H
H
p+pHH
and
n >
pHH
2−p−pHH
, the stability of the two fixed points x∗ and x∗∗ switches with the
relative size of pHH compared to p. When pHH < p, the fixed point x∗ is stable
and x∗∗ is unstable, but when pHH > p, x∗ is unstable and x∗∗ becomes stable
(Figure 2.3). The expressions for x∗ and x∗∗ and the linear stability analysis
of them can be found in Appendix A. More detailed derivations can be found
in the Mathematica notebook file in the Supplementary Information.
Whether the frequency of Hawk behaviour at the two fixed points is
greater or smaller than 1/n also depends on the relative size of p and
pHH . The frequency of Hawk behaviour at the fixed point x∗ is x∗H =
p((2n3−n2+2n+1)p+(2n3+n2−2n−1)pHH)
((n2+1)p+(n2−1)pHH)2
, and the frequency of Hawk behaviour at the
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Figure 2.4: The frequency of Hawk behaviour at the fixed point x∗ (x∗H) and
the fixed point x∗∗ (x∗∗H ) are decreasing functions of n. (a) x∗H > 1/n > x∗∗H if
pHH < p. Here p = 0.5, and pHH = 0.3. (b) x∗H < 1/n < x∗∗H if pHH > p. Here
p = 0.5, and pHH = 0.7. The frequency of Hawk behaviour is always higher
than 1/n at the stable fixed point.
fixed point x∗∗ is x∗∗H =
(1−p)((p−pHH)(n2−2n−1)+2n3(2−p−pHH))
(p−pHH+n2(p+pHH−2))2
. They both are de-
creasing functions of n. When pHH < p, x∗H > 1/n > x∗∗H ; and when pHH > p,
x∗H < 1/n < x
∗∗
H (Figure 2.4). Therefore regardless of the relative sizes of p
and pHH , the frequency of Hawk behaviour at the stable fixed point is always
greater than 1/n, while the frequency of Hawk behaviour at the unstable fixed
point is always smaller than 1/n. Intuitively, at the fixed point x∗, where HH-
HD-DD coexist, an increase of pHH from p decreases the payoffs of both HH
and HD, which are the only subpopulations that contain the H behaviour.
In contrast, at the fixed point x∗∗, where HH-DH-DD coexist, increasing
pHH from p is of benefit to both HH and DH, which are the only subpopu-
lations containing H behaviour. In this way, the increase or decrease of the
abundance of H behaviour at the fixed points can be intuitively explained by
observing the payoff matrix.
2.5 Behaviour conditions on the match of life
stages
2.5.1 Payoff matrix
Besides conditioning one’s behaviour on the player’s own life stage or that
of the opponent, an individual can also condition its behaviour on whether
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the opponent is in the same life stage as itself. Therefore in a population
with two distinct life stages (young and senescent) and two basic behaviours
(A and B), there can be four different strategies: play A no matter if the
opponent is of the same or different life stages (AA), play A if the opponent
is of the same life stage, and play B if the opponent is of the different life
stage (AB), play B if the opponent is of the same life stage, and play A if the
opponent is of the different life stage (BA), and play B regardless of wether
the opponent is of the same or different life stages (BB). The proportion of
young individuals in the four strategic subpopulations are pAA, pBA, pAB, and pBB.
In the following we use σ and ρ to denote the probability that two individuals
of the same or different life stages meet each other. For example, when an AA
individual meets an AB individual, the probability that they are of the same
age is σAA↔AB = pAApBA + qAAqBA , and the probability that they are of different
ages is ρAA↔AB = pAAqBA + qAApBA. The payoff matrix Mˆ can then be written
down as

AA AB BA BB
AA a σAA↔ABa+ ρAA↔ABb σAA↔BAb+ ρAA↔BAa b
AB σAB↔AAa+ ρAB↔AAc σAB↔ABa+ ρAB↔ABd σAB↔BAb+ ρAB↔BAc σAB↔BBb+ ρAB↔BBd
BA σBA↔AAc+ ρBA↔AAa σBA↔ABc+ ρBA↔ABb σBA↔BAd+ ρBA↔BAa σBA↔BBd+ ρBA↔BBb
BB c σBB↔ABc+ ρBB↔ABd σBB↔BAd+ ρBB↔BAc d

(2.10)
2.5.2 Homogeneous life history
If all strategies have the same proportion of young individuals in the popula-
tion, denoted as p, the proportion of senescent individuals in all strategies is
q = 1 − p. Then σ = p2 + q2, and ρ = 2pq, the payoff matrix Mˆ reduces to
Mˆp
Mˆp =

AA AB BA BB
AA a σa+ ρb σb+ ρa b
AB σa+ ρc σa+ ρd σb+ ρc σb+ ρd
BA σc+ ρa σc+ ρb σd+ ρa σd+ ρb
BB c σc+ ρd σd+ ρc d
 (2.11)
Since σ + ρ = 1, the payoff matrix Mˆp also satisfies (Mˆpx)1 + (Mˆpx)4 =
(Mˆpx)2 + (Mˆpx)3. Therefore, it shares the same invariant of motion V =
xAAx
B
B/x
B
Ax
A
B that corresponds to the payoff matrix Mp in the interior of the
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Figure 2.5: a. Replicator dynamics on the surface of a S4 simplex. Game
and life history parameters used are identical to those used in Figure 2.1. This
figure is produced using the Dynamo package [Sandholm et al., 2012]. b. The
saddle-like surface Wk := {x ∈ S4 : xAAxBB = kxBAxAB} (k = 1) spanned by the
edges AA−AB−BB−BA−AA of the S4 simplex. Besides the boundary fixed
points shown in red circles, all points that satisfy xAA + xBA = 3/5, xBA = xAB
and xAA−xBB = 1/5 are equilibria in the interior of the Simplex (the red circle).
Life history and game parameter values used are the same as those in Figure
2.1.
S4 simplex. But the dynamics on the same invariant of motion are different
for Mˆp and Mp. In the replicator dynamics system that corresponds to Mˆp,
the interior fixed points satisfy xAA =
(−a+b+c−d)xBA−b+d
a−b−c+d , x
A
B = x
B
A, and xBB =
(−a+b+c−d)xBA+a−c
a−b−c+d . Therefore, the unique interior fixed point on each layer of
V is on the AA−BB diagonal (Figure 2.5b). Besides the line of interior fixed
points, there is a fixed point on each of the vertices and each of the edges
of the S4 simplex. The two stable fixed points shown in Figure 2.5a are at
the intersects between the line of interior fixed points and the surface of the
simplex. To compare the replicator dynamics that correspond to Mp and Mˆp,
we embedded the same coexistence game and life history trait that was used
in Figure 2.1 and plotted the replicator dynamics on the surface (Figure 2.5a)
and interior (Figure 2.5b) of the S4 simplex.
From the comparisons between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.5 we can see the
differences between conditioning behaviours on the life stages of one of the
players, and on the matching of life stages between the two players. In these
two figures, all strategies have the same life history (same proportion of young
individuals), and the rules are the same for all strategic behaviour interactions.
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If one conditions its behaviour on the age of itself or that of the opponent,
there is a line of fixed points on each face of the S4 simplex, any three different
strategies can coexist (Figure 2.1). However, if behaviours are conditioned on
the matching of life stages, three strategies can coexist only in one special fixed
point on the surface (Figure 2.5). But any two strategies can stably coexist
when other strategies are not present, which does not hold if behaviours are
conditioned on the life stage of the focal player or that of the opponent. In the
interior of the S4 simplex, if behaviours are conditioned on the life stage of the
focal player or that of the opponent, there is a whole surface of fixed points
that spans in the simplex, crossing through the AA-BB ↔ AA-BA ↔ AB-
BA↔ AB-BB ↔ AA-BB edges; in contrast if behaviours are conditioned on
the matching of the life stages between players, there is a line of fixed points
that extends from the fixed point on the AA-BB edge to the fixed point on
the AA-AB-BA face of the simplex.
2.5.3 Homogeneous and heterogeneous life history – an
example in a Stag-Hunt game
In a two-player coordination game with two strategic behaviours, the two
behaviours do not stably coexist. However, if behaviours are conditioned on
the matching of life stages between the two players, it is possible to have
both behaviours simultaneously. For example, in a Stag-Hunt game with the
following payoffs from behaviour interactions:
(Stag Hare
Stag 2 0
Hare 1 1
)
(2.12)
It is not profitable to go after a hare in a population of stag hunters, and it is
too risky to go for a stag alone when all others are chasing hares. Therefore,
populations would usually end up with all stag hunters or all hare hunters. In
a population with two life stages, a Stag-Hunt game can have four different
strategies: hunting stags no matter if the opponent is of the same or different
life stage (SS), hunting stags if the opponent is of the same life stage, and
hunting hares otherwise (SH), hunting hares if the opponent is of the same
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life stage, and hunting stags otherwise (HS), and always hunting hares (HH).
The dynamics of the frequency of Stag-Hunting behaviour xS depends on game
interactions, when more than one strategies are present.
xS = x
S
S + x
H
S
(
pHS p · x+ qHS q · x
)
+ xSH
(
pSHq · x+ qSHp · x
)
, (2.13)
where p = (pSS, pSH , pHS , pHH), q = (1 − pSS, 1 − pSH , 1 − pHS , 1 − pHH), and x =
(xSS, x
S
H , x
H
S , x
H
H)
T . If one of the strategies fixes in the population, the final
level of Stag-Hunting behaviour is no more determined by the payoffs from
game, but by the life history. If the SS strategy is fixed, xS = 1, if the SH
strategy is fixed, xS = (pHS )2 +(qHS )2, if the HS strategy is fixed, xS = 2pSHqSH ,
and if the HH strategy is fixed, xS = 0.
Both SH and HS strategies can stably preserve both stag-hunting and
hare-hunting behaviours. We illustrate this in examples shown in Figure 2.6.
In a population with homogeneous life history, all strategies have the same
proportion of young individuals in the subgroup. Starting from the presence
of all four strategies, the SH strategy dominates the others and finally fixes
in the population (Figure 2.6a). Since behaviours were conditioned on the
matching of life stages, when two individuals of the same life stages meets
each other, they go for Stag-hunting, and if the two players are of different life
stages, they hunt hares instead (Figure 2.6b). If the frequency of young indi-
viduals changes in one of the strategy subgroups, the demographic structure
of the population becomes heterogeneous. Altering the demographic structure
of only one strategy subgroup changes the fitness landscape of all interacting
strategies. For example, if we change the proportion of young individuals of
the SS strategy subgroup, starting from the previous coexisting state where
all four strategies coexist at equal frequencies, the SH strategy gains an ad-
vantages over all others and fixes in the population (Figure 2.6c). The overall
frequency of stag-hunting behaviour first increases from the previous equilib-
rium, decreases again as the HS and HH strategy go extinct, and finally
reaches a new equilibrium as SH fixes in the population (Figure 2.6d).
2.5. Behaviour conditions on the match of life stages 41
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
TimeTime
F
re
q
u
en
cy
of
S
tr
at
eg
ie
s
F
re
q
u
en
cy
of
S
ta
g
-H
u
n
ti
n
g
xHS
xSH
xHH
0 5 10 15 20 250.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 350.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
xHS
xHH
xSH
F
re
q
u
en
cy
of
S
tr
at
eg
ie
s
Time
F
re
q
u
en
cy
of
S
ta
g-
H
u
n
ti
n
g
Time
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
xSS
xSS
(pHS )
2 + (qHS )
2
(pHS )
2 + (qHS )
2
d b
a b c+d
d b
a b c+d
Figure 2.6: Dynamics in a stag-hunt game when the behaviour is conditioned
on the matching of life stages. (a) Frequency dynamics of a Stag-Hunt game
in a population with two distinct life stages. All strategies have the same
proportions of young individuals in the population, p = 2/3. Initial popu-
lation structure is: xSH = 0.1, xSS = 0.15, xHH = 0.4, and xHS = 0.45. (b)
Frequency dynamics of Stag-hunting behaviour. The final frequency of Stag-
Hunter behaviour is determined by the demographic structure (pHS )2 + (qHS )2,
rather than the intermediate fixed point of the basic behaviour interaction
game, (d − b)/(a − b − c + d). (c) Starting from the coexisting state where
all strategies have the same frequency and the same proportion of young in-
dividuals in the population (p = 2/3). If the frequency of young individuals
in the SS strategic group changes (pSS = 3/4 in the example), the fitness
landscape of all interacting populations change. The SH strategy takes over
the whole population, and all other strategies go extinct. (d) The overall
frequency of Stag-Hunting behaviour change to a different equilibrium due to
the population dynamics in panel c.
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2.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, population demographic structures are integrated into evolution-
ary game dynamics in a way that is similar to so called role games [Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010]. The life stages in our study are similar
to the “roles" in role games, but with two important differences. Firstly, in
role games, an individual has different sets of behaviours at different positions,
e.g. the behavioral options of a striker and a goalie are quite different. But in
our study, individuals always have the same set of basic strategic behaviours
even in different life stages. Second, in role games, individuals in one role
only interact with those in the other role. But in our study, an individual can
play with anyone else in random pairs. An important shared feature between
our design and the role games is that an individual’s life stage or role is in-
dependent of its current strategic behaviour. Therefore, the payoff from the
game does not affect an individual’s probability of playing different roles in
role games, and it does not affect the population demographic structure in our
settings. This leads to some similar properties of our model and of role games,
e.g. the existence of an invariant of motion when all strategic subgroups share
the same demographic structure.
Role games readily capture the characteristics in many social and biolog-
ical scenarios, where two populations are distinct in their sets of strategies
but not separable. Examples include conflicts between owner and intruder,
parents and offspring, wife and husband, queen and worker bees [Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998]. Our model, featured by life-stage dependent strategies,
may apply to many real world systems, including human societies. For ex-
ample, compared to most of the adult age groups, children and the elderly
differ remarkably in their level of cooperative behaviours [Gutiérrez-Roig et al.,
2014]. Similar to cooperation, trust has also been found to increase almost lin-
early from early childhood to the beginning of adulthood [Sutter and Kocher,
2007]. Not yet fully developed cognitive and strategic abilities have been sug-
gested to explain those behaviours observed in children [Gutiérrez-Roig et al.,
2014]. In contrast, the elderly exhibit greater concern for the welfare of others
[Bass et al., 1998], behave more idealistically when making ethical judgements
[Hartikainen and Torstila, 2004], and show much higher level of cooperation
[Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 2014]. Those are ascribed to the improvement in social
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reasoning with age, which allows the elderly to “make more use of higher-
order reasoning schemes", and thus be more willing to make compromises, to
acknowledge the need for considering multiple perspectives and to admit the
limits of knowledge [Grossmann et al., 2010]. Apart from human societies,
life history traits of different species differ greatly across the tree of life [Jones
et al., 2014]. Behaviours and the patterns of interaction vary, and may play a
crucial role to produce the great diversity in relative fecundity and mortality
of different species.
In the framework of the replicator dynamics, population size is infinitely
large, well mixed, all strategies have the same death rate, and the payoffs are
translated into reproduction rates. However, in real biological populations, re-
production rates often do not solely depend on frequency, but also on density.
Density dependent evolutionary stable strategies in populations without sub-
structure have been studied by [Cressman, 1990a,b] as well as by [Cressman
and Dash, 1987]. Besides density dependent reproduction rates, payoff may
affect other aspects of population dynamics as well. For instance, individuals
with higher payoff could be less sensitive to density limiting factors and thus
have higher carrying capacities [Novak et al., 2013].
In addition, it is important to study the case in which payoff feeds back to
population structure via chronological ageing. In populations with pre and/or
post-reproductive stages, the timing of entering and staying in the reproduc-
tive phase is very often not only determined by genetics, but by nutrients,
population density, dominance-specific behaviours and other factors that are
strongly affected by social interactions [Jorgenson et al., 1993; Komers et al.,
1997; Wootton, 1987]. Theoretical and empirical studies have also shown that
increased reproduction does not necessarily decrease lifespan [Baudisch, 2005;
Baudisch and Vaupel, 2012; Partridge et al., 2005], and extended life span
does not necessarily reduce reproduction [Holehan and Merry, 1986; Shan-
ley and Kirkwood, 2000], suggesting the potential for strategy evolution to
change population demographic structure through payoff from interactions in
the population.
One of the most straightforward ways for payoff from interactions among
individuals in the population to affect ageing is through nutrition. Successful
strategies in competition can increase the amount of available nutrient for
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animals that employ these strategies. However, the way that payoff inter-
acts with life history evolution can still be complicated even under the simple
assumption that payoff is linearly translated into the amount of nutrition.
On the one hand, nutrition is one of the ultimate reproductive timing factor
for many species. Richer nutrition leads to younger age at first reproduc-
tion, higher frequency of subsequent reproductive events, and better quality
of gametes [Gunasekera et al., 1995; Luquet and Watanabe, 1986,?; Sadleir,
1973; Schreck et al., 2001]. On the other hand, restricted calorie intake may
extend life span, retard age-related chronic disease [Heilbronn and Ravussin,
2003; Koubova and Guarente, 2003], and provide the chance of preserving
reproductive value when famine and other transient stress is over [Holliday,
1989; Shanley and Kirkwood, 2000]. Therefore it is not necessarily true that
higher payoff or more nutrient intake leads to greater reproductive success, if
reproductive stage structure and ageing is taken into consideration.
In this work we study the strategy dynamics of two basic behaviours in
a population with two life stages only (young and senescent). It would be
natural to extend it to more general cases, with multiple strategies and more
complex life history. [Argasinski and Broom, 2013] approach this by intro-
ducing a continuous version of the discrete Leslie Matrix and a concept for
large age classes. The authors also study the cases with multiple strategies
and multiple populations. We plan to present an analysis of the polymorphic
and monomorphic equilibria in populations with more general age structures
separately, emphasising the potential impact of different life histories.
To conclude, in this study we have developed a framework that integrates
life history into game strategies by conditioning basic strategic behaviours
on life stages. We studied the replicator dynamics of life stage dependent
strategies in a population with young and senescent life stages. In the simple
settings with two basic strategic behaviours A and B and two life stages, we
analysed the cases where basic strategic behaviours are conditioned on the life
stage of the focal player, the opponent, or the matching of life stages between
the two players. For each of the three cases, we have defined the specific
life stage dependent strategies, written down the payoff matrix, and studied
the replicator dynamics in populations with homogeneous and heterogeneous
life history. In populations with homogeneous life history, if basic strategic
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behaviours are conditioned on the life stage of either of the players, the two
payoff matrices become identical, and thus share the same dynamics on the
the invariant of motion in the interior of the S4 simplex. If behaviours are
instead conditioned on the matching of life stages between two game players,
the invariant of motion is the same, but the dynamics on it changes. In
populations with heterogeneous life history, new equilibria of the population
dynamics can emerge, and the global frequency of basic strategic behaviours
can be different from the game equilibrium.

Chapter 3
Life history sways the
evolutionary fate of mutants
In the previous chapter we studied the replicator dynamics in populations
with demographic structure. With the underlying assumptions of infinitely
large population size and the absence of mutation, we analysed the frequency
dynamics of standing phenotypic variations. In this chapter, we move on to
study the population dynamics in age-structured populations with finite sizes,
taking into account the effects of stochasticity and mutation. We aim at find-
ing out how demographic structure of the population affects the evolutionary
fate of a beneficial mutant under constant selection. Would the mutant be
more likely to fix in a population that is younger or older? Does it make a
difference if natural selection works on reproduction or survival, or both?
This chapter is based on a working manuscript in collaboration with Shun
Kurokawa, Stefano Giaimo, and Arne Traulsen. A detailed summary of the
authors’ contributions to this project can be found at the end of this thesis.
3.1 Abstract
In this work we study the effects of demographic structure on evolutionary
dynamics, when selection works on reproduction, survival, or both. In con-
trast with the previously discovered pattern that the fixation probability of
a neutral mutant decreases while population becomes younger, we show that
a mutant with constant selective advantage may have a maximum and/or
a minimum of fixation probability in populations with an intermediate fre-
quency of young individuals. This highlights the importance of life history
and demographic structure in studying evolutionary dynamics. It also shows
the fundamental differences between selecting on reproduction and on survival
when age structure is present. In addition, we evaluate the relative importance
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of size and structure of the population in determining the fixation probabil-
ity of the mutant. Our work lays the foundation for studying also density
and frequency dependent effects in populations where demographic structures
cannot be neglected.
3.2 Introduction
The emergence and subsequent dynamics of mutants play important roles in
determining the trajectory of evolution. The fate of a mutant is strongly
influenced by its relative fitness. The fitness of a mutant, or rather, the
fitness landscape of the whole population is not static, but ever changing
under influences of many factors, including density and frequency dependent
effects [Nowak and Sigmund, 2004].
In the past years, life history has been gaining its recognition as of fun-
damental importance in determining the trajectory of evolutionary dynamics
(Blute, personal communication). Depicting the trajectories of survival and
reproduction along the lifespan, life history is well known to have great influ-
ence on evolution in general [Charlesworth, 2001; Nunney, 1991, 1996; Vin-
denes et al., 2009]. Besides, life history also modulates the actual effect that
an increase in survival or reproduction has on the population growth rate,
and it accounts for part of the effective size of the population [Charlesworth
et al., 1994; Engen et al., 2005]. For the frequency dependent case, it has been
shown that life stage dependent strategic interactions can promote diversity
and push the distribution of strategic behaviours away from the equilibrium
determined by interactions alone [Li et al., 2015a]. However, it is not obvious
if certain demographic structures of the population would promote or obstruct
the spread and fixation of a beneficial mutant. This is the problem of our in-
terest in the present work, which may be the first step towards further studies
of stochastic effects of the frequency dependent case.
Pioneer work on this topic includes papers by Felsenstein [1971] and Emigh
[1979a,b]. One major goal of this previous work was to understand the evolu-
tionary dynamics in populations with overlapping generations. Overlapping
generation models are biologically more relevant to many species of interest
including humans, but they are inevitably associated with increased com-
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plexity, due to age or stage structure of the population. To fully capture the
demographic architecture of age-structured populations, not only the absolute
number and frequency of the mutant matter, but also its distribution across
different age classes. One important concept to note here is the reproduc-
tive value. The reproductive value of an individual was originally defined by
Fisher [1930] as “to what extent will persons of this age (or sex), on average,
contribute to the ancestry of future generations". It does so by accounting
for the remaining number of offspring he or she will produce discounted by
the increase of population size at the time of reproduction of these offspring.
More comprehensive explanations and examples are beautifully presented in
the books of Caswell [2001] and Houston and McNamara [1999]. In popula-
tions with demographic structure, individuals of different age have different
reproductive value. Consequently, the evolutionary fate summarised by the
fixation probability of a mutant, i.e. the probability that it ultimately takes
over the entire population, can vary greatly in populations with overlapping
generations, in contrast to the case where population demographic structure
is absent.
The pioneer researchers have made great analytical contributions under
various assumptions, such as large population size [Emigh, 1979a,b; Felsen-
stein, 1971], neutral [Emigh, 1979a] or weak selection [Emigh, 1979b], extreme
demographic structures [Emigh, 1979a,b; Felsenstein, 1971], etc. Under these
conditions, good approximations can be made to facilitate mathematical anal-
ysis. For example, if the sizes of subsequent age classes differ greatly or are
very close to each other, it is cogent to approximate hypergeometric sampling
with binomial sampling in order to capture the process of individuals enter-
ing the next age class. With impressive analytical dexterity, these pioneers
successfully summarised the vast complexity into a few easily understood pa-
rameters, such as the “effective population number" [Felsenstein, 1971] and
the “average reproductive value" [Emigh, 1979a] and used those for describing
evolutionary dynamics.
However beautifully analysed, the original work did not achieve the impact
it deserves in our opinion. This is maybe due to the inevitable mathematical
complexity or limited applicability dictated by stringent underlying assump-
tions. With the help of current increased computational power, we show that
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there are still surprises left uncovered in the original model first described in
Felsenstein [1971], even in the simplest case with only two age classes in a
well-mixed population and constant selection.
In the following we first describe the model, recall the fixation probability
of a neutral mutant in the first age class as a benchmark, and then we anal-
yse the pattern of fixation probability of a beneficial mutant in populations
with diverse demographic structures. We explore one by one the evolutionary
consequences of selecting on reproduction, survival and both. Finally, we eval-
uate the relative importance of structure and size in determining the fixation
probability of a beneficial mutant.
3.3 Model description
3.3.1 Life history and population update rules
Here we describe the life history features of individuals and updating rules of
the population, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In contrast with the original model
of Felsenstein [1971], we have fewer age classes, while adding different sources
of selective forces. Consider a haploid population in which individuals can live
up to age two at maximum. The numbers of individuals in age-one (young)
and age-two (old) are constant, denoted as N1 and N2, respectively. In each
time step, all individuals produce large amounts of offspring, proportional to
their fitness. Among them, only N1 survive and become the next generation of
young individuals. Similarly, only N2 of the young individuals at the previous
time step survive to enter the old age class. All old individuals die and are
removed from the population. The recruitment of young individuals from the
pool of new born offspring is treated as a process of sampling with replacement
(similar to the classic Wright-Fisher process), while the recruitment of old
individuals from young ones is treated as sampling without replacement. This
is to account for the majority cases when N1 is not extremely greater than, or
very close to N2. The fitness of mutant is assumed to be constant, and greater
than the fitness of the wild type, which is normalised to one. Selection may
work on reproduction (fitter individuals have more offspring), survival (fitter
individuals have higher probability to survive to age two), or a combination
of both.
3.3. Model description 51
Age n
...
large numbers of  
offspring
binomial 
sampling
(non-central)
hypergeometric
sampling 
Age 1 N1
Age 2 N2
select on survival
select on reproduction
Figure 3.1: Population update rules. The number of individuals in the
first and second age classes are fixed (N1 and N2). Individuals produce large
amounts of offspring proportional to their fitness, if selection works on repro-
duction. Otherwise they all produce the same amounts of offspring. Entering
of the first age class of the offspring follows binomial sampling, assuming that
the number of offspring is much greater than N1. Entering of the second age
class of the age-one individuals follows hypergeometric sampling. If selection
works on survival, fitter individuals have a higher probability to survive to the
next age class. Consequently, the sampling process becomes non-central hy-
pergeometric sampling. Compared to the original model described by Felsen-
stein [1971], we use only two age classes for simplicity, while the original model
has an arbitrary n age classes. In addition, we explore the difference of se-
lecting on reproduction, selecting on survival, and selecting on both. These
different sources of selective forces are not described in Felsenstein’s original
model.
3.3.2 Fixation probability of a selectively neutral mutant
We denote the state of the population at time t as a tuple x1x
(t)
2 , in which
x1 is the number of mutants in the young age class, and x2 is the number of
mutants in the old age class. The transition probability from x1x
(t)
2 to x1x
(t+1)
2
is
p[x1x
(t)
2 → x1x(t+1)2 ] = B
(
x
(t+1)
1 ;N1,
x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2
N1 +N2
)
H
(
x
(t+1)
2 ;N1, x
(t)
1 , N2
)
,
(3.1)
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where B(k;n, q) =
(
n
k
)
qk(1 − q)n−k denotes the probability of obtaining k
mutants in n draws with replacement, and q is the frequency of mutants
in the population. We use this binomial sampling to model the process
of for picking N1 individuals from the offspring pool in order to form the
new young age class. Similarly, H(k;N,K, n) =
(
K
k
)(
N−K
n−k
)
/
(
N
n
)
denotes
the probability of obtaining k mutants in n draws without replacement, in
which N is the total number of individuals, and K is the current number
of mutants. We use this hypergeometric sampling for drawing N2 young
individuals that enter the old age class in the next time step. There are
(N1 + 1)(N2 + 1) different states of the age-structured population, there-
fore the state transition matrix Pˆ (with elements p[x1x
(t)
2 → x1x(t+1)2 ]) has
the dimension (N1 + 1)(N2 + 1) × (N1 + 1)(N2 + 1). The fixation probabil-
ity vector ρˆ = (ρ00, ρ01, . . . , ρ0N2 , ρ10, ρ11, . . . , ρ1N2 , . . . , ρN10, ρN11, . . . , ρN1N2)
contains the fixation probabilities of the mutant type from each of the
(N1 + 1)(N2 + 1) distinct population states.
The transition matrix Pˆ is stochastic and has unique eigenvalue 1. Due to
the absence of mutation, we have ρ00 = 0 and ρN1N2 = 1. In practice, we can
thus remove the first row and first column of the transition matrix Pˆ to form a
new transition matrix P which corresponds to the fixation probability vector
ρ, which is ρˆ having the first element 0 removed. To calculate ρ, we compute
the eigenvector that corresponds to eigenvalue 1 of the transition matrix P
numerically, and then normalise it by setting ρN1N2 to 1.
As a benchmark for later comparisons, we show in Figure 3.2 the fixation
probability of a single neutral mutant arising from the young age class. We
can see that a neutral mutant is more likely to reach fixation in populations
with more old individuals than in populations with more young individuals.
A natural explanation of this pattern is the differentiated reproductive
value in the population. In an age-structured population, the fixation prob-
ability of a neutral mutation equals the initial frequency of the mutant sub-
population weighted by reproductive values [Emigh, 1979a]. The reproductive
value of an individual of a given age expresses the contribution of this individ-
ual to the future ancestry of the population. To compute reproductive values,
one can use a matrix population model [Caswell, 2001]. That is a square ma-
trix which contains the vital rates (i.e. survival and fertility) of the population
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Figure 3.2: Fixation probability of a neutral mutant in a population of total
size 20. Symbols are results from numerical calculation (based on the tran-
sition matrix), the solid line is the known analytical solution (see Appendix
A). Dashed line marks the fixation probability when age structure is absent.
There are two age classes in this example, therefore the frequency of young
individuals ranges from 0.5 to 1. The neutral mutant has higher probability
to reach fixation in populations with more old individuals than in populations
with more young individuals.
organised by demographic class. In the case of an age-structured population,
the first row of the matrix contains the fertilities of each age class. The fertil-
ity at the top of column k gives the number of offspring born to an individual
in age class k which successfully enters the first age class at the next time step.
The subdiagonal of the matrix contains the age-specific survival probabilities.
The entry with coordinates (j+1, j) contains the fraction of individuals in age
class j at time t that will be in age class j + 1 at time t+ 1. All other matrix
entries are zero. The matrix population model can be right-multiplied by the
population state vector. The result of this multiplication is the projection of
the population state to the next time step. If this operation is reiterated, then
the vector representing the population state eventually becomes proportional
to the leading right eigenvector of the matrix population model. At this point,
the population is in a demographically stable state and its growth rate cor-
responds to the leading eigenvalue of the matrix. With appropriate scaling,
the leading left eigenvector gives the reproductive value of each age class. As
this model only involves matrix algebra, it is entirely deterministic. In our
case, the matrix population model is a 2× 2 matrix, as we only have two age
classes. As we assume a constant size, the leading eigenvalue of this matrix
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must be unity. Using the description of the life history in our population given
in Section 3.3.1 and setting N2 = N −N1, our matrix population model is(
N1/N N1/N
N2/N1 0
)
. (3.2)
The right eigenvector of this matrix corresponding to the eigenvalue of unity
is eR = (N1/N,N2/N)T . This vector is already scaled to give the stable age
distribution in the asymptotic population. The corresponding left eigenvector
eL = (N/N1, 1) gives the reproductive values. With these two vectors, we
can now give reproductive value weights to the initial frequency of a neutral
mutant of young age in our population at demographic stability. The mutant’s
reproductive value thus equals to N/N1. The reproductive value in the total
population is the population size N multiplied by the scalar product eL · eR,
which is the reproductive value at stability in the unit size population. Taking
the ratio of the initial mutant reproductive value to the total reproductive
value in the population, we obtain 1/ (N1(2−N1/N)), which corresponds to
the fixation probability of the mutant [Emigh, 1979a]. The derivative of this
last quantity with respect to N1 is − 2N(N−N1)N21 (N1−2N)2 , which is strictly negative.
Therefore, the fixation probability of a neutral mutant has decrease as the
frequency of young individuals increases.
Another way to understand this pattern is to calculate directly the age-
structure dependent fixation probability. Denote f as the frequency of young
individuals in the population, the fixation probability of a single mutant in a
population of size N is 1/((Nf(2− f)). A derivation of this fixation proba-
bility can be found in 7.2.1.)
To set the basis for later comparisons, we have derived the fixation prob-
ability of a neutral mutant in the first age class. In the following we focus on
the population dynamics and fixation probability of a beneficial mutant that
has a constant selective advantage r > 1. We explore one by one the effects
of selecting on reproduction, survival and both.
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3.4 Selection on reproduction
If selection only works on reproduction, the mutant produces r times more
offspring compared to the wild type. The transition probability from state
x1x
(t)
2 to x1x
(t+1)
2 is then
p[x1x
(t)
2 → x1x(t+1)2 ] = B
(
x
(t+1)
1 ;N1,
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 ) +N1 − x(t)1 +N2 − x(t)2
)
H
(
x
(t+1)
2 ;N1, x
(t)
1 , N2
)
(3.3)
It seems difficult to find a closed form of the fixation probability without
making a substantial number of additional assumptions, such as approximat-
ing the (noncentral) hypergeometric distribution with a binomial distribu-
tion, which requires that Ni+1 is either very small or close to Ni [Emigh,
1979a,b]. Nevertheless, we can obtain valuable analytical insights from cal-
culating E[x(t+1)1 + x
(t+1)
2 ], the expected total number of mutants in the next
time step (Details in 7.2.2.1).
E[x
(t+1)
1 + x
(t+1)
2 ] =
x
(t)
1 N2
N1
+
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )N1
(r − 1)(x(t)1 + x(t)2 ) +N1 +N2
(3.4)
Although E[x(t+1)1 + x
(t+1)
2 ] is not a proxy of the fixation probability per se, it
illustrates an important aspect of the fixation dynamics.
Given that the total size of the population is fixed, age structure of the
population is determined by the relative numbers of young and old individuals.
Replacing N2 with N − N1, we observe a minimum of the expected number
of mutants in the next time step, where dE[x(t+1)1 + x
(t+1)
2 ]/dN1 = 0. The
corresponding number of young individuals is
N∗1 =
√√√√x(t)1 N
(
1 +
N − x(t)1 − x(t)2
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )
)
(3.5)
Therefore, the fixation probability of the mutant could in principle also have
a minimum in populations with an intermediate fraction of young individuals
(Details in 7.2.2.2). In addition, the frequency of young individuals corre-
sponding to the minimum fixation probability should decrease with r, the
relative fitness of the mutant. We confirm these analytical results numerically
56 Chapter 3. Life history sways the evolutionary fate of mutants
in a population of total size 20, as shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Constant selection on reproduction in a population with fixed
total size of 20. Symbols represents the fixation probability of a single young
mutant with fitness r. The solid line in the first panel represents the fixation
probability in the neutral case when r = 1. There is always a minimum of
the fixation probability for intermediate frequency of young individuals. The
frequency of young individuals at the minimum decreases when r increases.
3.5 Selection on survival
If selection only works on survival, the mutant type has the same fecundity
as the wild type, but is r times more likely to survive to age-two. Because
of the selective advantage of the mutant, the survival step follows the non-
central hypergeometric distribution instead of the standard hypergeometric
distribution. The total number of sampling events (N2) is fixed, individuals are
sampled one by one, and there is competition among individuals. Under these
conditions, we have to use Wallenius’ noncentral hypergeometric distribution
rather than Fisher’s noncentral hypergeometric distribution [Fog, 2008b]. In
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this case, the transition probability from state x1x
(t)
2 to x1x
(t+1)
2 is
p[x1x
(t)
2 → x1x(t+1)2 ] = B
(
x
(t+1)
1 ;N1,
x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2
N1 +N2
)
HW
(
x
(t+1)
2 ;N1, x
(t)
1 , N2, r
)
,
(3.6)
in which HW is Wallenius’ noncentral hypergeometric distribution, for which
closed form implementations are numerically cumbersome [Fog, 2008a].
When the selective advantage of the mutant r is small, HW is can be ap-
proximated by the corresponding standard hypergeometric distribution, and
thus the fixation probability of the mutant is similar to that of the neutral
case (Figure 3.4a). However, when r is large, we observe a remarkable increase
of the fixation probability in populations with an intermediate frequency of
young individuals (Figure 3.4b-d).
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Figure 3.4: Constant selection on survival in a population with a total fixed
size of 20. Symbols represent the fixation probability of one single mutant in
the young age class with fitness r. The solid line in the first panel represents
the fixation probability in the neutral case, when r = 1. When r is small,
the fixation probability decreases monotonically, resembling the neutral case.
But when r becomes larger, there is an intermediate maximum of fixation
probability. The corresponding frequency of young individuals increase when
r increases.
Although we cannot calculate the exact fixation probability analytically
due to the complexity associated with the Wallenius’ noncentral hypergeo-
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metric distribution, it is still possible to understand intuitively the pattern of
having a maximum of fixation probability in populations with intermediate
frequency of young individuals.
In the limit of very large selective advantage r, basically all mutants in
the young age class will be selected to survive into the old age class, if N2 is
greater than the total number of mutants. Otherwise, N2 mutants will survive
and enter the old age class. Therefore, E[x(t+1)2 ] ≈ min
(
x
(t)
1 , N −N1
)
. When
N1 is small (N1 < N − x(t)1 ), as N1 increases by 1, E[x(t+1)2 ] = x(t)1 does
not change; but when N1 is large (N1 > N − x(t)1 ), as N1 increases by 1,
E[x
(t+1)
2 ] = N − N1 decreases by 1. On the other hand, because there is no
selection on reproduction, the expected number of young mutant in the next
time step E[x(t+1)1 ] is simply proportional to the global frequency of mutants
in the whole population, E[x(t+1)1 ] = N1(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )/N . As N1 increases by
1, E[x(t+1)1 ] increases by (x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )/N , which is between 0 and 1. This
is irrespective of the value of N1. Taken together, the expected number of
mutants in the next time step is E[x(t+1)1 + x
(t+1)
2 ] = E[x
(t+1)
1 ] + E[x
(t+1)
2 ].
Since 0 6 E[x(t+1)1 ] 6 1, E[x
(t+1)
2 ] ≈ 0 when N1 is small but E[x(t+1)2 ] ≈ −1
when N1 is large, we expect E[xt+11 +x
(t+1)
2 ] to first increase and then decrease,
as N1 increases.
3.6 Selection on both reproduction and survival
From previous sections, we can see that if selection only works on survival, a
beneficial mutant has a minimal probability to get fixed in populations with
intermediate level of young individuals. But if selection works on survival
and when the selective advantage of the mutant is sufficiently large, there is a
maximum of the fixation probability when the frequency of young individuals
is intermediate.
If selection works on both reproduction and survival, we assume that a ben-
eficial mutant may not only produce more offspring, but also is more likely to
survive to the next age. This double effects could result from the fact that the
mutant allocates extra payoff to both reproduction and survival. Consider a
mutant that has increased access to food resources compared to the wild type.
As a result, she may choose to (or be genetically programmed to) consume
the extra food immediately, thereby allocating most of the benefits to repro-
duction and relatively little to improving her chance of surviving to the next
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round of reproduction. On the other hand, she may choose to save most of the
food for provision, thereby has little improvement in reproduction, but large
increase in the chance of survival. There exists an established body of alloca-
tion theory, with different functional forms for allocating limited resource to
reproduction and survival. This further leads to different patterns of ageing
in different species and populations. For a recent review, see Baudisch and
Vaupel [2012]. In the case where selection works on both reproduction and
survival, and the mutant allocates its payoff benefit to both, the transition
probability from state x1x
(t)
2 to x1x
(t+1)
2 is
p[x1x
(t)
2 → x1x(t+1)2 ]
=B
(
x
(t+1)
1 ;N1,
r1(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )
r1(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 ) +N1 − x(t)1 +N2 − x(t)2
)
HW
(
x
(t+1)
2 ;N1, x
(t)
1 , N2, r2
)
,
(3.7)
in which r1 and r2 represent that the mutant produces r1 times offspring
compared to the wild type, and is r2 times more likely to survive to the next
age.
The major purpose of this work is not to compare different allocating
patterns but rather to demonstrate the effects of different selective forces. We
therefore choose arbitrarily the simple case where r1 = r2 to study the model,
as Altrock and Traulsen [2009] did in studying the evolutionary dynamics of
stochastic birth-death processes. (In 7.2.3, we show an example of the effects
of allocating benefits between reproduction and survival following a linear
pattern, where r1 and r2 are different. Following the same method, the effects
of allocating benefits in other ways can be studied.)
From the numerical calculation results (for the special case that r1 = r2 =
r) show in Figure 3.5, we see the pattern of fixation probability of a single
mutant in the young age class has combined effects from both selecting on
reproduction and on survival. On one hand, the value of the fixation proba-
bility is more similar to the case that selection works solely on reproduction.
(Note that the end points in the first and the third panel are identical, when
the effect of age structure disappears.) On the other hand, the pattern of
having an apparent maximum of the fixation probability in populations with
intermediate frequency of young individuals, is more similar to the case when
selection works solely on survival.
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Figure 3.5: A comparison between selecting on reproduction, survival and
both. The figure shows the fixation probability of a single beneficial mutant
in the young age class. Solid lines represent the fixation probability in the
neutral case, when r = 1. The pattern of selecting on both reproduction and
survival shows a combined effect. The magnitude of the fixation probability
across different age structures is closer to the case when selecting solely on
reproduction, but the shape of having an intermediate maximum when r is
large is similar to selecting on survival (note the different scale on the y-axis).
Total population size N = 20.
3.7 Comparing the effects of population size
and demographic structure
The relative importance of population size and demographic population struc-
ture in determining the fixation probability depends crucially on the relative
fitness of the mutant. If the relative fitness of the mutant is very small, pop-
ulation size has a larger effect, but if the fitness of the mutant is large, the
demographic structure of the population plays an essential role (Figure 3.6).
The pattern of having an intermediate minimum of fixation probability when
selecting on reproduction is preserved irrespective to population size. The
intermediate maximum of the fixation probability when selecting on survival
exists when the relative fitness of the mutant is not too small.
Another interesting observation is that the fixation probability of a sin-
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Figure 3.6: Population size has a larger effect if the relative fitness advantage
of the mutant is small. Demographic population structure has a larger effect
if the relative fitness of the mutant is large. Symbols of different colours
represent different population size. Color coding is consistent in all panels.
gle mutant is higher in larger populations compared to smaller populations,
when r is large, and when selecting on reproduction or both reproduction and
survival. This is a feature of the Wright-Fisher process (Details in Appendix
7.2.4).
3.8 Discussion and conclusion
Although it is clear that the likelihood of incorporating a beneficial mutation
in the gene pool is a function of the life history architecture of the popula-
tion, little has been done to pinpoint the direct effects of different life history
patterns on promoting or hindering adaptive evolution. In this work we ap-
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proach this problem building on the basis of the seminal Felsenstein model
of populations with overlapping generations [Felsenstein, 1971]. We explore
the effects of different sources of evolutionary forces, including selecting on
reproduction, survival and a combination of both. We also study the relative
importance of the size and demographic structure of the population.
First, our work reveals fundamental differences between selecting on re-
production and survival in populations with age structures. The differences
are remarkable even in the simple case where the population is spatially well-
mixed, and neither density nor frequency affects the relative fitness of the
mutant. It is known that in well-mixed populations under constant selection,
selecting on reproduction or survival is equivalent when mutation is absent
[Ewens, 2004; Kaiping et al., 2014]. In spatial structured populations, select-
ing on reproduction and survival are different in general, but it is possible
to produce the same effects. For example, under the Moran process scheme,
selecting on reproduction with a birth-death updating rule is still equivalent
to selecting on survival with a death-birth updating rule, in any populations
with “homogeneous” structures (e.g., lattices, cycles, and island models) and
symmetric dispersal [Taylor et al., 2011]. It is worthwhile to note that in
degree-heterogeneous graphs, the fixation probability of an advantageous mu-
tant depends crucially on if selection works on reproduction or survival [Antal
et al., 2006; Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Kaveh et al., 2015]. Even when
selection works only on reproduction, the sequence of birth and death events
can lead to completely different evolutionary dynamics [Kaveh et al., 2015;
Zukewich et al., 2013]. For almost any random graph, a selectively advan-
tageous mutant almost always has higher-than-neutral fixation probability if
birth takes places before death, but has lower-than-neutral fixation probabil-
ity if death happens first [Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015]. Although the dif-
ferences of selecting on reproduction and survival is relatively well recognised
and studied in spatially structured populations, less is known in populations
with demographic structure.
Here we show that even under constant selective advantage, life history
of individuals in the population makes the evolutionary dynamics differ dras-
tically with different sources of selective forces. In the future, it would be
interesting to go beyond the simple case of constant selection and investi-
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gate the effects of density and frequency dependent fitness of the mutants.
Under the well-mixed condition, low density favours individuals who direct
their efforts towards exploring the ecological environment and thereby max-
imising their reproduction rates. But under high density conditions, since
most resources have already been absorbed into the population, it is more
efficient to direct one’s effort towards exploiting other population members
through interactions [Blute, 2011]. Usually, the successfulness of a strategy
is not determined by its nature alone, but on the presence and frequency of
other strategies in the population. Density and frequency effects are hardly
disconnected from each other in natural populations, and it is often needed to
take both into account in order to capture the important features of evolution-
ary dynamics, especially when there is noteworthy changes in population size
[Huang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015b; Novak et al., 2013]. Under the framework
of Evolutionary Game Theory, elegant conditions such as the 1/3 rule have
been obtained [Imhof and Nowak, 2006; Lessard and Ladret, 2007; Nowak
et al., 2004], under which strategies such as cooperation via direct reciprocity
can evolve in the first place. But it is unclear if such conditions still hold in
populations with demographic structures. Therefore it is interesting to study
the coevolution between population demography and strategy interactions in
future works.
In natural populations, species display an enormous variety of different
life history patterns [Jones et al., 2014]. It is very often that mutations af-
fect the fitness of individuals in both reproductive and survival aspects. A
classical example is the throughly discussed ornamented train of male pea-
cocks, which are sublimely beneficial in terms of mating success, but at the
same time tremendously costly when it comes to the chance of escaping from
a predator. Another beautiful example is the shape of wings in migrating
birds. Pointed wings are aerodynamically desirable for fast and long-distance
flights [Berthold, 1996; Bowlin and Wikelski, 2008; Hedenström, 2002; Minias
et al., 2015; Mönkkönen, 1995]. But on the other hand, they reduce the ma-
noeuvrability that help birds with foraging and courtship displays [Alatalo
et al., 1984; Swaddle and Lockwood, 2003]. Precisely due to the high benefits
and high costs of pointed wings, the change of selective pressure leads to the
change of wing morphology in bird populations. This has been observed in
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many passerine species, e.g. the fast evolution of stonechats Saxicola torquata
in response to changing environmental conditions [Baldwin et al., 2010]. It
is interesting also to note that evolution can go to great detail in balancing
the cost and benefits of a single morphological trait, and life history serves
as a channel through which evolutionary forces fine tune the balance. As an
example and also a demonstration of its plastic potential, it is found that the
juveniles of migrating birds have less pointed wings compared to adults. This
is due to the fact that juveniles are more naive and thus more vulnerable to
predators. Under elevated predation pressure, improved manoeuvrability is
more important than migration performance, particularly in the early stage of
life [Pérez-Tris and Tellería, 2001]. For more examples of the amazing variety
in survival and reproduction trajectories over the life course across species,
Jones et al. [2014] provides a recent review.
In this work we focus on the simple case of two age classes. We have shown
how the fixation probability of a mutation with effect on certain components
of the life history is influenced by the demographic structure of the resident
population, i.e. the relative frequency of young versus adult individuals. We
note that a natural interpretation of the same results can also be given in
terms of the rate of ageing that characterizes the resident population. In fact,
the relative abundances of young and adult individuals depend on the proba-
bility of newborn survival to young age and the probability of surviving from
young age to old age. Ageing is defined as an age related deterioration in
survival. Ageing features in a large number of species and is one of the most
salient life history traits. It follows from the definition of ageing that, in our
model, populations that are composed by a higher fraction of young individ-
uals are characterized by a higher rate of ageing (i.e. stronger deterioration
in survival with age). Conversely, populations with a higher representation
of old individuals may possess no ageing at all or even negative ageing (i.e.
survival does not decline but it may even increase with age, see Baudisch and
Vaupel [2012] and Jones et al. [2014]).
In this way, our results can be directly linked with the effect that an impor-
tant life history trait exerts on adaptive evolution. If natural selection works
on reproduction, for any beneficial mutant, intermediate rates of ageing always
reduce fixation probability, although the chance of fixation may be higher in
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populations with low or negative rates of ageing, depending on the difference
in fitness between the mutant and the wild type. If natural selection works
on survival and the fitness difference between the beneficial mutant and the
wild type is not too small, there is a maximum of fixation probability in pop-
ulations with intermediate rates of ageing, while in populations with extreme
positive or negative rates of ageing, the fixation probability of the beneficial
mutant is reduced. If natural selection works on both survival and reproduc-
tion, depending on how fitness advantages are allocated and the magnitude
of the fitness difference between mutant and the wild type, complex patterns
with multiple extrema of the fixation probability with respect to the rate of
ageing can emerge.
To summarize, in this work we have studied the direct effects of popula-
tion demographic structures on stochastic evolutionary dynamics, under the
constant selection regime. Using a model with two age classes and constant
population size, we have compared the fixation probability of mutants un-
der different population demographic structures. Different targets of selective
forces, as well as the relative impacts of the size and structure of the popula-
tions are also evaluated in our analyses. Through this work, we hope to call
attention to the importance of considering life history when studying evolu-
tionary dynamics. Facilitated by modern computational power, now we have
the opportunity to delve into many interesting questions that were technically
not approachable a few decades ago. Our work opens up new directions for
future research, including the coevolution of population structure, resource
allocation and strategic dynamics, the impacts of demography on the rate
of adaptive evolution, and the density/frequency dependent fitness effects in
populations with different life history patterns.

Chapter 4
Which games are growing
bacterial populations playing?
In previous chapters we integrate biological factors into evolutionary game
theory models by taking into account life history traits of individuals and de-
mographic structures of populations. But these models do not apply to any
specific species or biological system. In this chapter, we apply evolutionary
game theory to explain population dynamics of bacteria in double-culture ex-
periments. Classic evolutionary game theory models focus on the frequency
dynamics of the different strategies, neglecting the density effects. But in bac-
terial communities, both the frequencies and densities of different species can
change rapidly, and have profound ecological influences. We link the effects
of population growth with evolutionary game theory by incorporating fre-
quency dependent growth rates in the Lotka-Volterra equation. Our working
model captures the main features of the population dynamics observed in ex-
periments, including the population size expansion and alternative coexisting
states.
This chapter is based on the publication [Li et al., 2015b], coauthored by
Cleo Pietschke, Sebastian Fraune, Philipp M. Altrock, Thomas C.G. Bosch
and Arne Traulsen. A detailed summary of the authors’ contributions to this
publication can be found at the end of this thesis.
4.1 Abstract
Microbial communities display complex population dynamics, both in fre-
quency and absolute density. Evolutionary game theory provides a natural
approach to analyse and model this complexity by studying the detailed in-
teractions among players, including competition and conflict, cooperation and
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coexistence. Classic evolutionary game theory models typically assume con-
stant population size, which often does not hold for microbial populations.
Here we explicitly take into account population growth with frequency depen-
dent growth parameters, as observed in our experimental system. We study
the in vitro population dynamics of the two commensal bacteria (Curvibac-
ter sp. (AEP1.3) and Duganella sp. (C1.2)) that synergistically protect the
metazoan host Hydra vulgaris (AEP) from fungal infection. The frequency
dependent, nonlinear growth rates observed in our experiments indicate that
the interactions among bacteria in co-culture are beyond the simple case of di-
rect competition or, equivalently, pair-wise games. This is in agreement with
the synergistic effect of anti-fungal activity observed in vivo. Our analysis
provides new insight into the minimal degree of complexity needed to appro-
priately understand and predict coexistence or extinction events in this kind
of microbial community dynamics. Our approach extends the understanding
of microbial communities and points to novel experiments.
4.2 Introduction
From protists to humans, all animals and plants are inhabited by microbial
organisms. There is an increasing appreciation that these resident microbes in-
fluence evolutionary important traits (e.g., fitness) of their hosts[McFall-Ngai
et al., 2013; Sommer and Bäckhed, 2013]. The host and its associated mi-
crobiota do not evolve independently, but form a metaorganism that evolves
as a whole under natural selection [Brucker and Bordenstein, 2013; Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 2008]. The microbial organisms affect host fitness
in various ways. They contribute by enhancing digestion and mediating energy
balance via nutrient absorption [Douglas et al., 2001; Gustafsson and Laurell,
1959; Nicholson et al., 2012; Yatsunenko et al., 2012], controlling pathogenic
reactions [Buffie et al., 2012; Fraune et al., 2014; Kamada et al., 2013], stim-
ulating stem cell turnover [Jones et al., 2013] and the maturation of immune
systems [Mazmanian et al., 2005; Weiss et al., 2012], and potentially trigger-
ing normal development of organs [Montgomery and McFall-Ngai, 1994; Rawls
et al., 2004]. They even promote hybrid lethality/sterility and thus contribute
to speciation [Brucker and Bordenstein, 2013]. Despite the well-accepted im-
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portance of microbiota to the normal functioning of the host, the molecular
and cellular mechanisms controlling interactions within the metaorganisms
are poorly understood and many key interactions between the associated or-
ganisms remain unknown [Prosser et al., 2007]. Moreover, the applications
of theoretical frameworks to improve the understanding of the ecological in-
teractions among microbiota and between host and microbiota are still very
limited. Notable exceptions include Blaser and Kirschner [2007]; Bucci and
Xavier [2014]; Marino et al. [2014]; Schluter and Foster [2012]; Stein et al.
[2013].
There exists an established body of ecological theory for the population
dynamics of large organism, such as plants and animals. But whether these
theories also apply to the dynamics of microorganisms is largely unknown,
yet seldom questioned [Prosser et al., 2007]. Compared to large organisms,
bacteria not only differ greatly in the small physical size and high growth rate,
but also in the drastic changes of population size. These differences are most
profound during neonatal host development, while the microbiota establish.
There has been comparably little theoretical development for the interaction
dynamics of size fluctuating bacterial populations [Hallatschek et al., 2007;
Melbinger et al., 2010]. A recent study showed that microbiota colonization
patterns during host development display complex dynamics, which cannot be
explained with standard models of density independent competition [Franzen-
burg et al., 2013]. This study also showed that the microbiota composition in
fresh water Hydra hatchlings changed greatly during development. A highly
variable initial stage was followed by transient adult-like phase in which the
microbial composition was temporarily very similar to the stable adult micro-
biota, yet only retained for a short time. The adult microbiota composition
only reappear after further drastic changes. Remarkably, a similar “in-out-in"
colonization pattern of adult-like microbiota composition was also observed
in human infants [Palmer et al., 2007].
Even more interestingly, the complex microbiota in Hydra prevents infec-
tion by the filamentous fungus Fusarium sp. [Fraune et al., 2014]. Using
a germ free Hydra model it was shown, that germ free polyps were highly
susceptible to fungal infection, while restoring the complex microbiota in gno-
tobiotic polyps prevented infection. Testing single bacterial isolates from Hy-
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dra in mono-associations revealed that none of the tested bacterial colonizers
alone was able to provide full antifungal resistance. In contrast, resistance, as
observed in control polyps, was achieved in polyps di-associated with the two
most dominant bacterial colonizers, Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp., by
exhibiting a strong synergistic effect [Fraune et al., 2014]. This finding pro-
vides compelling evidence for the importance of bacteria-bacteria interactions
in the normal functioning of Hydra associated microbiota.
Besides empirical evidence, ecological theories are indispensable to our
understanding of the full complexity in the host-microbiota interplay. Evo-
lutionary game theory takes its root in classic game theory, but focuses on
the frequency dynamics of strategies in populations instead of the quality of
competing strategies themselves. Therefore it is especially suited for studying
microbial population dynamics on the ecological time scale, where the fitness
landscapes of different types are constantly changing [Nowak and Sigmund,
2004], and thus selection is frequency dependent [Frey and Reichenbach, 2011;
Kerr et al., 2002; Rainey and Rainey, 2003]. In the case of deterministic
dynamics, there exists a strong link between game dynamics and ecologi-
cal dynamics. The game theoretical replicator equation is mathematically
closely related to the ecological Lotka-Volterra equation with linear growth
rates [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998]. The replicator equation focuses on rela-
tive changes in population size under frequency dependent fitness, which can
provide conceptual insights into the microscopic interactions between indi-
vidual bacteria cells. The Lotka-Volterra equation describes populations of
changing size. Therefore it can be conveniently linked to experiments [Ellner
and Guckenheimer, 2011; May and McLean, 2007; Murray, 2007]. In the case
of two interacting species, the replicator dynamics and the competitive Lotka-
Volterra equations predict competitive exclusion, i.e., extinction of one type,
or coexistence at a unique state of population composition.
Considering the classic Lotka-Volterra equation as the potential frame-
work to understand bacterial interaction reveals limitations in modeling the
population dynamics of the two most abundant bacterial species that inter-
act synergistically to protect the Hydra host from pathogenic infection. We
show that the patterns observed in our experiments require a more detailed
consideration of bacteria-bacteria interactions. This includes growth rates
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that nonlinearly depend on the relative abundance of different species in the
exponential growth phase.
Compared to human and other more complex model species, the early
metazoan Hydra provides a comparably simple system with a genetically de-
termined bacterial community colonizing the surface of ectodermal epithelium
[Fraune and Bosch, 2007]. Therefore, it serves as a powerful model organism
for studying the interactions between the host and its bacterial community
[Bosch, Thomas CG, 2013; Fraune and Bosch, 2010]. In addition, the syner-
gistic interaction between the two dominant bacteria species is especially ex-
citing. It provides anti-fungal protection to the host that cannot be achieved
by either of the bacteria when associated with the host alone [Fraune et al.,
2014]. In a first attempt to quantitatively understand the host-microbial in-
teraction, here we determine the mechanisms of bacterial interactions without
the host’s influence. We performed double culture experiments in vitro with
the two most abundant actors in the Hydra microbiota. In order to develop
a mathematical model for this scenario, here we propose general principles
governing the interactions within the microbiota. We start by adding fre-
quency dependent growth rates into the Lotka-Volterra framework and infer
the possible dynamics for linear and quadratic frequency dependent growth
rates and then put these results into the context of our empirical data. These
data suggests interactions between multiple players as one possible mecha-
nism of the interactions among individual bacterial cells, which can lead to
the global population dynamics qualitatively similar to the one observed in
our experiments.
4.3 Materials and methods
We study the interactions between the two species of Betaproteobacteria
Curvibacter sp. AEP1.3 (C) and Duganella sp. C1.2 (D). Both bacteria be-
long to the order of Burkholderiales, while C represents a Comamonadaceae
and D an Oxalobacteraceae [Fraune et al., 2014]. We chose these two bacteria
because (i) they are naturally found in the bacterial community of the fresh-
water polyp Hydra vulgaris (AEP), and are the two most abundant species in
the microbiota (C:75.6% and D:11.1%) [Fraune et al., 2014]; (ii) the synergis-
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tic interaction between the two bacteria species effectively provides anti-fungal
protection for the host [Fraune et al., 2014]; and (iii) the morphology of their
colonies can be distinguished from each other on agar plates.
4.3.1 Monoculture and double culture experiments
To determine the growth rate in monocultures, we inoculated for each bac-
terium 50 ml R2A medium with 10 concentrations between 2.0 × 103 and
1.0 × 105 cfu/ml of C or D of an overnight culture. The cell numbers of
each bacteria were estimated by counting the colony forming units (cfu), and
was cross-checked with optical density (OD) measurements at OD600 = 0.1
(1.0×108 cfu/ml for C and 2.0×107 cfu/ml for D). In double culture exper-
iments, we kept a total initial concentration of 1.0× 105 cfu/ml and applied
a gradient of different initial frequencies of species C and D. Over the course
of three days, three times a day, we measured the OD600 of the cultures and
plated two dilutions, which were adjusted individually to the optical density,
on R2A agar plates. After two days we counted the number of colonies of D
and after four days those of C. This difference in counting times was due to
different growth rates of the two bacteria on agar plates (Figure 4.1).
4.3.2 Data preparation and analysis
For cell culture growth over time in both monocultures and double cultures,
we calculated growth rate functions by applying a linear regression to the
log-linear transformed data. The goodness of fit was calculated using the
(adjusted) R2 [Draper and Smith, 1998; Kvålseth, 1985]. In monoculture
experiments for both species, we tested the dependency of growth rate in the
exponential growth phase on a gradient of initial cell densities.
In double culture experiments for both species, we tested linear, quadratic
and cubic functions of growth rate on a gradient of initial frequencies. These
three different model hypotheses were then compared using Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) [Bozdogan, 1987] and Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) [Burnham and Anderson, 2004; Posada and Buckley, 2004], based on
the likelihood functions of a normally distributed error term in the linear re-
gression model. The most appropriate models were chosen with the agreement
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Figure 4.1: We quantify the density of Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp. by the
method of counting colony forming units (cfu). At each time point, we took a sample
of the bacterial culture and perform a series of dilutions. The diluted samples were then
plated on a petri dish with solid agar medium. After two days, the fast growing Duganella
sp. (indicated by cyan arrows) already formed clear and distinct colonies on the plates.
After four days, the slow growing Curvibacter sp. (indicated by green arrows) also formed
distinct colonies. Under the assumption that one colony was formed by one single founder
cell in the medium, we can calculate the cell densities of each of the two bacteria species
in the original sample by adjusting the numbers of colonies with corresponding dilution
factors.
between both AIC and BIC tests.
In double culture experiments, if the cell density value was missing for one
of the species at a certain point of time during the exponential growth phase,
this data point was excluded when plotting the growth trajectories. But the
cell density of the species that did have a valid count can still be used for
calculating growth rate.
4.4 Mathematical model
Our mathematical model is directly motivated by experimental observations.
We analyzed the growth trajectories of the double culture experiments of
Curvibacter sp. (C) and Duganella sp. (D), the two most abundant species
that interact synergistically to protect the Hydra host from fungal infection.
Depending on the initial condition, one of the two species eventually becomes
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dominant in frequency (Figure 4.2). This resembles a coordination game
[Nowak, 2006a], which is characterised by an unstable intermediate fixed point
and two stable boundary fixed points. However, the submissive species does
not go extinct but keeps growing in absolute density. This is a key feature,
which is usually neglected in game theoretic models where only changes in
frequency, fixation and respective extinction are considered.
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Figure 4.2: Change of the frequency of Curvibacter sp. in double cultures with
Duganella sp. The frequency of Curvibacter sp. approaches the 0 or 1 boundaries over time,
depending on the initial frequency of both types. If the culture was inoculated with a high
frequency of Curvibacter sp., the frequency of it remains high (green trajectories), otherwise
Duganella sp. quickly outgrows and eventually pushes the frequency of Curvibacter sp.
towards 0 (blue trajectories). This resembles the dynamics in a coordination game, where
the two homogeneous populations are stable.
Based on these experimental findings, we propose a mathematical model
building on the classic Lotka-Volterra competition dynamics, which is math-
ematically closely related to the replicator equation in game theory models
Hofbauer and Sigmund [1998]. In our model, the maximum growth rates in
the exponential growth phase of the bacterial culture are frequency dependent.
This model of in vitro bacterial interactions in growing populations serves as
a basis for making comparisons with the in vivo scenarios influenced by the
host.
4.4.1 Lotka-Volterra competition model with linear fre-
quency dependent growth rates
The population dynamics in two-species Lotka-Volterra competition models
is been thoroughly discussed in textbooks [May and McLean, 2007; Murray,
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2007]. Those models assume that the two species only compete for the same
limited resources, e.g. the same food, or space with unrestricted nutrient
provision, or territory which is directly related to food resources, but the
two species do not interact otherwise. Then the dynamics are given by the
following growth equations:
C˙ =
(
rC − rC
KC
C − rD
KC
D
)
C
D˙ =
(
rD − rD
KD
D − rC
KD
C
)
D
(4.1)
Both species exhibit logistic growth when cultured alone. The value of
growth rates r and carrying capacities K are positive constants. Equations
(4.1) predict that the two species can coexist only when exactly rCKC =
rDKD. Otherwise, the species with higher rK value wins the competition,
and the other species goes extinct (competitive exclusion).
We depart from this simple case and consider the case where growth rates
rC and rD are frequency dependent linear functions. The frequency of C is
denoted as x (x = C/(C + D)), and the frequency of D is thus 1− x, in the
double culture system. Therefore rC and rD can be written as linear functions
of x:
rC(x) = γ0 + γ1x
rD(x) = δ0 + δ1x
(4.2)
Since the growth rates rC and rD are the maximum growth rates reached
at the exponential growth phase, they are always positive. Consequently,
we require γ0, δ0, γ0 + γ1, and δ0 + δ1 to be positive. Then the population
dynamics is described by a set of modified Lotka-Volterra equations, with
linear frequency dependent growth rates and interaction coefficients. This is
equivalent to logistic growth functions with frequency dependent competition
coefficients. In the following, we assume constant carrying capacity for both
species, KC = KD = K. For constant and linear growth rates, it is straight-
forward to generalize our findings to KC 6= KD. There are four steady states
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– three boundary cases (0, 0), (0, K), (K, 0), and the mixed solution:
(C∗, D∗) =
(
δ0 − γ0
γ1 − δ1K,
γ0 − δ0 + γ1 − δ1
γ1 − δ1 K
)
(4.3)
The mixed solution is only biologically meaningful if 0 < C∗, D∗ < 1. The
relation C∗ > 0 implies that the growth rates of the two species have to
intersect at a intermediate frequency. For the overall dynamics, there are four
qualitatively different cases, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Population growth with linear frequency dependent growth rates, cf.
Eqs. (4.2). The four main panels show the population dynamics. The insets show the cor-
responding linear frequency dependent growth rate functions, in which the x-axis represents
the frequency of C. In the main panels, filled circles are stable fixed points and open circles
are unstable fixed points. The orange arrows show the stream line trajectories of the popu-
lation dynamics starting from a variety of initial states. The gradient background captures
the speed of change. In (a) and (b), the growth rate functions cross in the range (0, 1), lead-
ing to a mixed steady state (C∗, D∗). (a) If rC(0) > rD(0) and rC(1) < rD(1), (C∗, D∗)
is stable (rC = 0.5 + 0.1x, rD = 0.2 + 0.6x). (b) If rC(0) < rD(0) and rC(1) > rD(1),
(C∗, D∗) is unstable ( rC = 0.2 + 0.7x, rD = 0.3 + 0.3x). (c) If rC(x) < rD(x) for all x,
there is no interior fixed point and only (0,K) is stable (rC = 0.2+ 0.5x, rD = 0.3+ 0.6x).
(d) If rC(x) > rD(x) for all x, there is no interior fixed point and only (K, 0) is stable
(rC = 0.2 + 0.5x, rD = 0.1 + 0.4x).
The set of points C + D = K satisfy the condition C˙ + D˙ = 0, therefore
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it is an invariant manifold [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Wiggins, 2003] of
the dynamics. Once this invariant manifold has been reached, the population
dynamics will not lead away from it. Let f = |C0 + D0 −K| be the distance
from any point (C0, D0) on the plane spanned by C and D to this invari-
ant manifold. This distance decreases monotonically regardless of the initial
condition (C0, D0) off the C +D = K manifold:
f˙ =
C0 +D0 −K
|C0 +D0 −K|
(
C˙0 + D˙0
)
= −|C0+D0−K|
(
rC(x)
C0
K
+ rD(x)
D0
K
)
< 0.
(4.4)
Note that this holds regardless of the functional form of the original frequency
dependent growth rates used in our model rC(x) and rD(x).
We can determine the local stability of the fixed points from the signs
of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the fixed points [Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998; Strogatz, 2000]. The fixed point at (0, K) is stable if γ0 < δ0.
The fixed point at (K, 0) is stable if γ0 + γ1 > δ0 + δ1. Intuitively, these
points are stable if the resident type grows faster than the invading type. In
Figure 4.3 (panel a) we illustrate the case where the growth rates rC(x) and
rD(x) intersect in the interval (0, 1), and rC(0) > rD(0). Then the fixed points
where one species goes extinct (K, 0) and (0, K) are unstable. On the one-
dimensional stable manifold C+D = K, the stability of fixed points alternate.
Hence, the internal fixed point (C∗, D∗) is stable. The other cases in Figure
4.3 (panal b-d) can be analyzed in the same way.
4.4.2 Quadratic growth rates
In order to obtain multiple intersections of the frequency dependent growth
rates in the range (0, 1), the simplest possibility is that one of the growth rate
function is linear and the other is quadratic in species frequency. Therefore,
we assume a quadratic term in the growth rate function of species D, and
keep rC(x) and the population dynamics in Eqs. (4.1) unchanged,
rD(x) = δ0 + δ1x+ δ2x
2 (4.5)
Depending on whether rD(x) has a maximum or a minimum, there are
two different cases allowing the growth rate functions to intersect twice in
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the frequency range (0, 1). To have two intersections of rC(x) and rD(x)
within (0, 1), the function rC(x) − rD(x) must have two roots in the same
range. Besides the two boundary solutions (0, K) and (K, 0), there are now
two intermediate solutions on the manifold C +D = K, given by
(C∗1 , D
∗
1) =
K
2δ2
(γ1 − δ1 + Ω, 2δ2 + δ1 − γ1 − Ω) (4.6)
and
(C∗2 , D
∗
2) =
K
2δ2
(γ1 − δ1 − Ω, 2δ2 + δ1 − γ1 + Ω) (4.7)
where Ω =
√
(γ1 − δ1)2 + 4(γ0 − δ0)δ2.
Similar to the cases where rC(x) and rD(x) are linear functions of x, all
trajectories lead to the invariant manifold C +D = K. The stability of fixed
points alternates on this one-dimensional line. Conditioned on whether rD(x)
has a maximum or a minimum, there are two different stability patterns on
the manifold. The stability patterns are illustrated in Figure 4.4. When the
quadratic function rD(x) has a maximum (δ2 < 0), the two eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix at (0, K) are −δ0 < 0 and γ0 − δ0 > 0. The two eigenvalues
at (K, 0) are −γ0−γ1 < 0 and −γ0−γ1 +δ0 +δ1 +δ2 < 0. Therefore, (0, K) is
unstable and (K, 0) is stable. Thus, the intermediate fixed point (C∗1 , D∗1) is
stable and (C∗2 , D∗2) is unstable, as shown in Figure 4.4 (panel a). The stability
of fixed points when rD(x) has a minimum can be analyzed in the same way,
as shown in Figure 4.4 (panel b). When the carrying capacity values KC and
KD are not equal, the fixed points can still be calculated analytically, but
(C∗1 , D
∗
1) and (C∗2 , D∗2) do not always both fall in the first quadrant.
4.5 Results
Let us now come to a comparison of our theoretical model and our exper-
iments. The two bacteria species Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp. were
mixed with different initial frequency combinations and inoculated from a to-
tal concentration of 1.0×105 cfu/ml. Depending on the initial condition, the
frequency of one of the species becomes much higher than the frequency of the
other (Figure 4.2), resembling the scenario of positive frequency dependent se-
lection in a coordination game. However, the absolute concentrations of both
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Figure 4.4: Population growth with quadratic growth functions, cf. Eq. (4.5). Schematic
phase trajectories near the steady states when frequency dependent growth rate functions
intersect twice. There always are a stable node (C∗1 , D∗1) and a saddle point (C∗2 , D∗2) in
the first quadrant. The insets represent the frequency dependent growth rates, in which
the x-axis is the frequency of C. There are two general cases in which rC and rD intersect
twice. In (a), the quadratic growth rate has a maximum due to δ2 < 0 (rC = 0.4 + 0.1x,
rD = 0.2 + 2x − 2.1x2). In (b), the quadratic growth rate has a minimum due to δ2 > 0
(rC = 0.2 + 0.2x, rD = 0.6− 1.8x+ 1.8x2).
species increased over time in any case. The observed bacterial population
dynamics is different from competitive exclusion in the sense that the ad-
vantageous species cannot entirely take over the population. The submissive
species kept growing in absolute number despite the decrease in frequency.
We first confirmed experimentally that the maximum growth rates of the
two bacteria did not change with the initial density in monoculture exper-
iments (Figure 4.5a). The maximum growth rates of Curvibacter sp. and
Duganella sp. in monoculture inoculated with a gradient of initial densities
are fitted to constant functions rC = 0.146 (R2 = 0.998), and rD = 0.420
(R2 = 0.996). This suggests that differences in the growth rate in double cul-
tures (Figure 4.5b) depend on the frequency combinations of the two species,
rather than their absolute densities.
The frequency dependent growth rate of Curvibacter sp. in double culture
is fitted to a linear function rC = 0.049x+0.128 (adjusted R2 = 0.970), and the
growth rate of Duganella sp. in double culture is fitted to a quadratic function
rD = −0.825x2 + 0.898x+ 0.080 (adjusted R2 = 0.972), shown in Figure 4.5b.
For both rC and rD, we fitted the data to linear, quadratic and cubic functions.
The models of best fit are chosen by both finite sample corrected Akaike
information Criterion [Bozdogan, 1987] and Bayesian information Criterion
[Burnham and Anderson, 2004; Posada and Buckley, 2004]. The carrying
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capacity values K of both bacteria are 5.9× 108 cfu/ml, which is the median
of all double culture experiments (shown as the red line in Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.5: (a) The growth rates of Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp. do not dependent
on initial density in monoculture experiments. rC = 0.146 (R2 = 0.998), rD = 0.420 (R2 =
0.996). (b) The growth rate at exponential growth phase change with initial frequencies in
double cultures. This depends on the frequencies of both types, not necessarily in linear
fashion. The frequency dependent growth rates of Curvibacter sp. were fitted to a linear
function rC = 0.049x + 0.128 (adjusted R2 = 0.970), and that of Duganella sp. were
fitted to a quadratic function rD = −0.825x2 + 0.898x+ 0.080 (adjusted R2 = 0.972). The
presence of Duganella sp. affects the growth rate of Curvibacter sp., but not substantially.
In contrast, Curvibacter sp. has strong inhibiting effects on the growth rate of Duganella
sp., across a wide range, even at very low frequency.
From the comparison between growth rates in monoculture and double
culture experiments, we observe that the presence of Duganella sp. does not
profoundly influence the growth rates of Curvibacter sp., across a wide range
of initial frequencies. But interestingly, the presence of Curvibacter sp. greatly
influences the growth rate of Duganella sp., even at very low frequency (2%).
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When the initial frequency of Curvibacter sp. approaches 0 in double culture
experiments, the growth rates of Duganella sp. do not converge to its growth
rate when cultured alone. This disproportionally large effect of Curvibacter
sp. on the system indicates its role as a keystone species [Mills et al., 1993;
Paine, 1995] in the simplified microbiota.
Inserting the parameters measured from experiments, the phase plane dy-
namics obtained from Eqs. (4.1) is shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Growth trajectories plotted on the phase plane predicted by the model. The
green trajectories lead to the unstable interior fixed point where Curvibacter sp. dominates
in frequency. The cyan trajectories lead to the stable interior fixed point where Duganella
sp. dominates. Filled and empty circles are stable and unstable fixed points, respectively.
The red line is the invariant manifold C + D = K. The darkness of the contour plot
represents the speed of change. The fast region along the diagonal represented by light
colors separates the trajectories and pushes them to the two distinct fixed points in the
interior. Near fixed points the speed of change is very low, therefore the two bacteria can
coexist for a long time even near the internal unstable fixed point.
4.6 Discussion
Growth is important for bacterial populations. In comparison to larger organ-
isms the size of bacterial populations can fluctuate greatly and rapidly. Dras-
tic changes occur particularly during the colonization of new environments.
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Such new environments can be abiotic systems like deep-sea hydrothermal
vents [Alain et al., 2004; Guezennec et al., 1998], and biotic systems, includ-
ing neonatal invertebrate hosts [Franzenburg et al., 2013] and vertebrate hosts
[Palmer et al., 2007]. The composition of host associated microbiota play an
important role in the development and functioning of the host [Goldmann
et al., 1978]. Prior work has shown that the colonization processes display
fast growth and complex dynamics of the microbiota composition. Interesting
examples include the in-out-in colonization pattern of the adult-like micro-
biota composition, observed in Hydra and human babies [Palmer et al., 2007].
In addition, the “division of labor" like dynamics in marine bacteria that col-
onize the chitin substratum [Baty et al., 2000], the life-cycle like dynamics of
Pseudomonas biofilms that connect extrinsic structure and intrinsic protein
expression [Sauer et al., 2002], and cross-feeding and spatial partitioning of
biofilm spaces between ecotypes [Poltak and Cooper, 2011] are also interesting
examples of complex bacterial population dynamics during colonization of new
environments. More examples of bacterial interactions in biofilms during the
colonization of new environments can be found in the review by Hall-Stoodley
et. al. [Hall-Stoodley et al., 2004]. Despite the wealth of intriguing empiri-
cal discoveries, theoretical work that informs about principal mechanisms and
leads to synthesis and integration of the available data is still limited [Prosser
et al., 2007].
Although various models have been developed to describe the time dynam-
ics of bacterial growth, most of them only focus on the growth of one single
species [Buchanan et al., 1997; Koch, 1982; Kompala et al., 1986]. On the
other hand, bacterial inter-species interactions are often studied in systems
that have been intentionally excluded from notable fluctuations of popula-
tion density [Frey and Reichenbach, 2011; Kerr et al., 2002; Schluter and
Foster, 2012]. In this way, species frequencies instead of absolute densities
are used to describe population dynamics. For example, in the work of Kerr
et. al.[Kerr et al., 2002], the authors studied the spatial interactions of three
strains of Escherichia coli. It was found that when interactions are localized,
the dynamics of the three strains resemble a “rock-paper-scissors" game, with
the colicin-resistant strain beating the colicin-producing strain, the colicin-
producing strain beating the colicin-sensitive strain, and the colicin-sensitive
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strain outgrowing the colicin-resistant strain. This provided compelling sup-
port for game theoretical predictions in microbial ecology and evolution. How-
ever, the total population size was kept relatively constant on static agar
plates. Therefore frequency alone was sufficient to describe the population
dynamics observed.
In contrast to populations that have been kept in constant size for theo-
retical convenience, here we analyze the dynamics in growing bacterial pop-
ulations. We show that it is necessary to take into account both frequency
and density to fully characterize the interaction dynamics. Considering micro-
bial density alone, the growth curves of both Curvibacter sp. and Duganella
sp. resemble logistic growth. Solely from the frequency perspective, the two
bacteria seem to play a coordination game. Only in the interplay of the two
effects we can aptly describe the full picture. Our analysis reveals a system
with two intermediate fixed points where both species coexist only if we look
at both frequency and density dynamics together.
In evolutionary game theory, the vast majority of studies consider cases
where the population size is either constant or where the system can be recast
into a form where population growth does not affect the outcome. When it
comes to growing populations – as in our case – many concepts and definitions
become more cumbersome. Consequently, experimental and quantitative de-
scription also become more delicate. For example, the typical definition of
cooperative traits is that they increase the fitness of others at a fitness cost
to self. But this increase could refer to the relative abundance or the abso-
lute abundance. The former is commonly assumed in the evolutionary game
theory literature, while the latter is commonly found in the experimental
evolution literature. In other words, interactions could either influence the
relative abundance or the absolute abundance in a variety of ways that has
not yet been fully addressed by theoretical models.
In classic logistic growth under the Lotka-Volterra dynamics, or equiva-
lently, the game theoretical replicator dynamics, the growth rates in expo-
nential growth phase (simply denoted as growth rates in the following) are
usually assumed to be constant [Berryman, 1992; Hanson and Tuckwell, 1981;
Tsoularis and Wallace, 2002; Verhulst, 1838]. The overall density dependent
change in population size can be introduced by altering the carrying capacity
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of the system. This alteration can arise from inter-specific and intra-specific
competition. For example, the carrying capacity could theoretically be deter-
mined by an evolutionary game [Novak et al., 2013]. In our case, we have seen
that the growth rates are affected much more by bacterial interactions than
the carrying capacities. Such growth rates can be frequency dependent due to
interactions in the population other than direct competition [Hibbing et al.,
2009].
A recent modeling study showed that social interactions between
antibiotic-tolerant and antibiotic-sensitive bacteria can lead to patterns of
multiple stability and thus explained how the microbiota composition can
switch after antibiotic treatment [Bucci et al., 2012]. Linear frequency de-
pendent growth rates have also been reported in a study of microbial random
phase variation, which influences bacterial survival in changing environments
[Wolf et al., 2005]. A particularly interesting finding was reported by Trosvik
et. al. [Trosvik et al., 2008]. There the authors found a parabolic interac-
tion relationship between Bacteroides uniformis and Escherichia coli, similar
to our case. In our experimental system, the growth rate of Duganella sp.
depends on the frequency of Curvibacter sp. also in a parabolic way. In the
study by Trosvik et. al., E. coli had a positive effect on B. uniformis only to
a certain point in the range of frequency, and then the effect turned out to be
detrimental. Mechanistically, the positive effect of E. coli at low frequency
might result from the removal of residual oxygen from the growth medium
[Hagen et al., 1982], given that B. uniformis is strictly anaerobic. But when
the frequency of E. coli became higher, the authors argued that direct compe-
tition might outweigh the benefits from oxygen removal, and thus limits the
growth of B. uniformis [Trosvik et al., 2008].
In our case, Curvibacter sp. has an overall suppression effect on the growth
of Duganella sp. in double cultures. This effect is nonlinearly frequency de-
pendent, most remarkably when the frequency difference of the two species
is large. This is consistent with the situation in vivo. Inside the Hydra host,
Curvibacter sp. has absolute dominance in abundance, despite that Duganella
sp.’s faster growth rate when cultured alone [Fraune et al., 2014]. We have
shown in the analysis that direct pairwise interactions between two bacterial
cells are not enough to capture the complexity of the system. This leads us
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to consider the possibility that bacterial cells are involved in “multiplayer" in-
teractions [Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010, 2014; Kurokawa and Ihara, 2009]. In
these scenarios, multiple bacterial cells interact with each other at the same
time. Studies have shown that bacteria can form nanotubes with multiple
other cells and exchange molecules with each other [Dubey and Ben-Yehuda,
2011; Sanchez, 2011]. This could be the physical basis of bacterial multiplayer
games. In the simple system we have studied, at least a three-player game
of degree two [Ohtsuki, 2014] is needed to account for the observed quadratic
nonlinearity in frequency dependent payoffs. An example of a three-player
game that produces similar population dynamics pattern of two alternative
intermediate equilibria can be found in Appendix Figure (7.3). Other alter-
native explanations include the effect of phage infection in the system. Our
hypothesis is that the phage that infects Curvibacter sp. at an population
equilibrium level may switch its host to Duganella sp. and thus induces an
outbreak event that reduces its Malthusian growth rate by increased mortal-
ity. Testing of this hypothesis is an extension of this project. Since frequency
dependent interactions can lead to multiple coexistence states Gokhale and
Traulsen [2010], this effect could contribute to the tremendous microbial di-
versity coexisting with the numerically dominant few in natural environments,
known as the “rare biosphere" [Sogin et al., 2006].
To conclude, in this study we show that it is necessary to consider both fre-
quency and density dynamics in bacterial populations with noteworthy density
fluctuations. Using a mathematical model, we examined the effects of linear
and quadratic frequency dependent growth rates in Lotka-Volterra dynamics.
The interaction patterns of the system are richer with additional intermediate
fixed points when frequency dependent growth rate functions intersect more
than once. Most importantly, our empirical data provide compelling evidence
that the maximum growth rate can be a non-linear function of frequency, with-
out effects of density limitation. This strongly indicates that there must be
mechanisms other than direct pairwise interactions (including competition for
a limiting resource) among the growing bacterial populations. Such complex
patterns provide a mechanism for the maintenance of vast microbial diversity
in the natural environment. Our study focuses on the interactions among
growing bacterial populations without the effect of host or other environmen-
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tal factors, serving as a null model for studying higher-level interactions.
Chapter 5
The invisible player
In the previous Chapter, we found nonlinear frequency dependent growth rates
of two most abundant bacteria (Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp.) of the
Hydra microbiota in an artificial environment. The nonlinear frequency de-
pendent growth rates lead to complex population dynamics with alternative
coexisting states. However, the mechanistic causes of such phenomenon are
still unclear. Phages have been suggested to play important roles in mediating
bacterial interactions. In our experimental system, it has been found that for
each of the bacteria, there is an associated phage that is integrated in the
bacterial genome (Tim Lachnit, personal communication). Surprisingly, the
phage that associated with Curvibacter sp. can also cross infect Duganella
sp. Here, we build a mathematical model of bacterial-phage interactions that
recovers the nonlinear frequency dependent growth rates observed in experi-
ments.
This chapter is based on a working paper in collaboration with Tim Lach-
nit. This project has both experimental and modeling parts, but only the
modeling part is presented here. A detailed summary of the authors’ contri-
butions to this project can be found at the end of this thesis.
5.1 Introduction
“I can imagine nothing more terrifying than an Eternity filled with
men who were all the same. The only thing which has made life
bearable. . . has been the diversity of creatures on the surface of
the globe. – T.H. White, The Book of Merlyn”
Naturalists have always been fascinated by the beautiful coexistence of
diverse life forms on earth. It has been a long tradition that we seek the
ways that generate, maintain and promote such splendour of biodiversity in
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nature. For example, the pioneer work of Gause [1932] in yeast, combining
experiments and mathematical modeling, suggests that given enough time,
one species will always outcompete the other, driving the submissive species to
extinction. This forms the cornerstone of “Gause’s principle", which has later
been coined with the name “the competitive exclusion principle” by Hardin
[1960], stating that two species competing for the same resource cannot stably
coexist in the same area at the same time.
However logically sound, the predictions of the theory have been challenged
by observations, particularly in aquatic ecosystems. Despite their great diver-
sity in species and different phenotypes within the same species, most of the
phytoplankton compete for the same small set of nutritions. How could a
great number of species coexist in a nutritionally poor environment, while
competing on the same set of resources? This question raised by Hutchinson
[1961] was later named after him as the “Hutchinson’s paradox ”.
Some of the potential solutions of the paradox have already been put
forward in the seminal paper of Hutchinson [1961] himself. For example, he
argued that predation and the constant changes of the environment might have
kept natural systems far away from equilibria, and the subtle heterogeneities
in space, such as the gradient of light intensity and the Langmuir spirals in the
wind drift, might have created diversified niches for different species. More
explanations and conditions have been proposed, studied with mathematical
models and tested by experiments [Cadotte, 2007; Chesson, 2000; Narwani
et al., 2013; Shea et al., 2004; Sommer, 1984; Welborn et al., 1996]. Although
there might still be some small unsolved issues, the general impression is that
biologists have well deciphered Hutchinson’s paradox.
However, recent observations in bacteria co-culture experiments bring for-
ward new questions (Chpter 4). The two bacterial species (Curvibacter sp.
and Duganella sp.) were isolated from the natural microbiota of freshwater
hydra (Hydra vulgaris). In a simple well-mixed liquid culture, the two bacte-
rial species not only coexist for a long time, but also at distinct population
states, depending on the initial frequencies at inoculation. It shows that both
biodiversity and the diversity of biodiversity can emerge in such extremely
simple and spatially homogenous culturing environment. How could this hap-
pen? To study this, we started with a mathematical model, building on the
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basis of the classic Lotka-Volterra dynamics. Then we realised that in order to
have the two distinct internal equilibria, the maximum growth rate, observed
at the exponential phase of the growth curve, has to be nonlinearly frequency
dependent, at least for one of the bacterial species. Inspired by the model
prediction, experiments were designed and then performed by Cleo Pietschke
and Sebastian Fraune. Eventually, the nonlinear frequency dependent growth
rate of Duganella sp. was confirmed in co-culture experiments (Chapter 4,
published in [Li et al., 2015b]).
On the other hand, despite that it explains the multiple coexisting states
observed in experiments, the nonlinear frequency dependent growth rate itself
brings up more fundamental questions. What has made the growth rate of
a bacterium, which was supposed to be an intrinsic feature of the species,
dependent on the relative abundance of it compared to its competitors in
the same environment? What are the interactions in the community that
produced such phenomena? And, is the culturing medium really such a simple
abiotic environment as we have assumed?
If all assumptions hold (i.e. population is well-mixed, interactions among
cells are random, and are confined to direct competition on the same re-
source), the two bacterial species would not be able to coexist, as indicated
by the competitive exclusion principle. On the other hand, if any of the
assumptions is relaxed, several mechanisms could potentially explain the co-
existence of the two bacteria, including adapting to different spatial niches
[Burmølle et al., 2010], interacting in small groups via nanotubes [Dubey and
Ben-Yehuda, 2011], interference competition [Amarasekare, 2002], and cross-
feeding [Freilich et al., 2011], for a general review, see Hibbing et al. [2009].
But none of the above mentioned mechanisms has been explicitly shown to
produce nonlinear frequency dependent growth rates, nor the resultant al-
ternative coexisting states of the population. In addition, our experimental
collaborators have so far not found biofilm or nanotube formation, and there
is no evidence that the two bacteria species interfere the growth or cross-feed
each other (Tim Lachnit, personal communication).
On the other hand, analysis of the genome sequences of the two bacteria
revealed an alternative possibility. Tim Lachnit found that the sequence of a
prophage integrated in the genome of each of the two bacterial species. Follow-
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ing this hint, we isolated phage particles that correspond to the two prophage
sequences. This leads us to the hypothesis that the two phages might be the
“invisible players” in the system that interact with the two bacterial species
and produce the frequency dependent growth rates of them, as observed in
experiments.
It has been shown that the interactions among bacteria and the phages
which infect them can produce complex population dynamics and are impor-
tant for both ecosystem functioning [Goodridge and Abedon, 2003; Rohwer
and Thurber, 2009] and human health [Faruque et al., 2005a,b; Levin and
Bull, 2004]. Phages not only shape the composition of bacterial communi-
ties, but also influence the evolution of bacterial genomes by both specialized
and generalized transduction of genetic materials among different hosts [Chen
and Novick, 2009; Fineran et al., 2009; Mazaheri Nezhad Fard et al., 2011].
Even in the standard in vitro cultures of bacteria, the presence of phages can
transform the seemingly simple and static artificial culture medium into an
evolving and highly dynamic biotic environment [Koskella and Meaden, 2013].
Interactions mediated by phages play important roles in the maintenance
of biodiversity in many ecosystems. One of them is via negative frequency
dependent selection by “Killing-the-Winners (KTW)” [Thingstad, 2000; Win-
ter et al., 2010]. The KTW model considers the dynamics of multiple species
of bacteria and phages in lytic interactions, showing that the density of each
bacterial host is controlled by the phage that infects it, in a top-down fashion.
The simple yet powerful model explains successfully the coexistence of many
bacterial species that compete in the same spatial and temporal environment.
In addition, it also recovers many empirical observations, such as the 1:10
ratio of the bacterial and viral abundance. But one assumption of the KTW
model does not apply to many natural bacterial communities. It assumes that
each species of phage only infects one species of bacteria, and one species of
bacteria is only infected by one single species of phage.
Evidence has shown that cross-infection between phage and bacteria is
common in nature [Holmfeldt et al., 2007; Poullain et al., 2008; Stenholm et al.,
2008; Sullivan et al., 2003; Wichels et al., 1998]. Phage infectivity and bacterial
resistance are key factors that determine the host range of phages [Duplessis
and Moineau, 2001; Hyman and Abedon, 2010; Rakhuba et al., 2010; Riede
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et al., 1985]. Although we still know very little about the general principles
which determine the relationship of who infects whom, recent studies have
uncovered some interesting patterns of the infection networks, such as nested
and modular [Flores et al., 2011], as well as multi-scale [Flores et al., 2013]
structures.
Taken into account the cross-infection between phages and bacteria, a
recent model by Jover et al. [2013] recovers the basic predictions of the KTW
model, such as the coexistence of different bacteria by top-down control of
phages. In addition, they show that trade-off conditions on the life-history
traits of both bacteria and phages are required for stable coexistence. Bacteria
with high growth rates are more vulnerable to phage infection, and phages
with a wide host range are less effective in infecting bacteria. But the model
of Jover et al. [2013] assumes that the infection relationships between bacteria
and phages are static, and the evolutionary arms race between bacteria and
phages is not considered. More recent studies show that the evolution of
host ranges of phages are of fundamental importance in bacterial communities
[Chaturongakul and Ounjai, 2014]. In addition, the cross-infection model
of Jover et al. [2013] does not predict alternative coexisting states. This
indicates that it might be necessary to consider the evolutionary aspect of
phage-bacteria interaction, and there might be other interactions except lysis
between bacteria and phages.
It has been found that the “outer membrane vesicles (OMVs)” of bacteria
play important roles in mediating interactions with the environment, includ-
ing protein secretion, immune and stress response, attachment, and defence
against phages. For a recent review, see MacDonald and Kuehn [2012]. The
spherical blebs mimic the outer membrane of bacteria, functioning as decoys.
Phages are found to have irreversibly bound to, and injected genetic materials
into the OMVs [Manning and Kuehn, 2011]. The typical diameter of OMVs
ranges from 10nm to 300 nm [MacDonald and Kuehn, 2012]. The relatively
large surface to volume ratio makes it very effective to absorb phage particles
in the environment. However, no mathematical model has been built to study
the role of OMVs in phage-bacteria interactions so far.
To provide a simple explanation of the nonlinear frequency dependent
growth rates of bacteria observed in experiments, and the resultant alternative
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coexisting states of the bacterial community [Li et al., 2015b], we develop a
simple mathematical model of bacterial population dynamics mediated by
the activity of phages. We take into account both the evolutionary aspects
of cross-infection and the effects of OMVs in the defence of bacteria against
phages.
5.2 Null model
Before considering the effects of phages adapting to changing frequency of
bacterial hosts, and the effects of OMVs as decoys produce by bacteria for
defence, we first build a null model that does not include these two factors.
It serves as the basis for later comparisons.
Firstly, we describe some basic interactions among different actors in the
phage-bacteria interaction system. The actors are two bacteria (Curvibacter
sp. and Duganella sp.) and two phages (Curvibacter -phage and Duganella-
phage). They are denoted as C, D, PC , and PD in the following.
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Figure 5.1: Actors and interactions in the phage-bacteria system.
In the null model, we assume all interactions are linear and follow the law
of mass action [Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2011]. It does not include stochas-
tic effects, only describing the deterministic dynamics of the system. As il-
5.2. Null model 93
lustrated in Figure 5.1, the basic inter-specific and intra-specific interactions
include:
1. Reproduction of the two bacteria, at a rate of αC for Curvibacter sp.
and αD for Duganella sp., respectively;
2. Direct competition: βCC and βDD are the suppression rates of intra-
specific competitions, βCD is the rate of suppression from Curvibacter
sp. to Duganella sp., and βDC is the rate of suppression from Duganella
sp. to Curvibacter sp;
3. Production of phages: γCC is the production rate of Curvibacter -phage
from Curvibacter sp., γDD is the production rate of Duganella-phage
from Duganella sp., γCD is the production rate of Duganella-phage from
Curvibacter sp, γDC is the production rate of Curvibacter -phage from
Duganella sp.
4. Death of the bacteria caused by phage infections: φCC and φDD are
the rates of death of Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp. caused by the
infection from their own associated phages, φCD and φDC are the death
rate from cross-infections, φCD is the death rate of Duganella sp. due
to the cross-infection by Curvibacter -phage, and φDC is the death rate
of Curvibacter sp. due to the cross-infection by Duganella-phage;
5. Decay of phages: µC and µD are the spontaneous decay rates of
Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp., respectively.
Assuming all parameters are constant, the population dynamics of the four
actors can be written in a system of ordinary differential equations:
P˙C = γCCC + γDCD − µCPC
P˙D = γCDC + γDDD − µDPD
C˙ = αCC − βCCC2 − βDCDC − φCCPCC − φDCPDC
D˙ = αDD − βDDD2 − βCDCD − φDDPDD − φCDPCD
(5.1)
We assume that the population dynamics of phages is much faster than that
of the bacteria during the lytic cycle [Delbrück, 1940]. This implies that the
first two equations in (5.1) quickly approach their asymptotic states where
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P˙C = 0 and P˙D = 0. On the fast time scale, while PC and PD converge to
equilibria, the values of C and D remain unchanged. On the slow time scale
while C and D are changing, PC and PD are assumed to be at their equilibria.
The separation of timescales allows us to simplify the analysis by studying
the fast and slow systems separately. We can solve the equilibria of the fast
system and then insert them into the slow system in order to approximate the
population dynamics of bacteria.
After replacing PC and PD with their unique stable equilibria,
PC = (γCCC + γDCD)/µC
PD = (γCDC + γDDD)/µD,
(5.2)
we can simplify the analysis further by rescaling the system to dimensionless
variables [Murray, 2007]. We remove the units from the system of equations
by a suitable replacement of variables. In this way, we reduce the number of
model parameters, making subsequent analyses simpler. In addition, we can
get the general and characteristic properties of the system without relying on
specific choices of parameters. The procedures of this standard technique is
reviewed in detail by Segel [1972].
By substituting the parameters and variables in the original equations with
a more suitable set of variables
x =
βCCµCµD + γCDφDCµC + γCCφCCµD
αCµCµD
· C
y =
βDDµCµD + γDCφCDµD + γDDφDDµC
αDµCµD
·D
(5.3)
and parameters:
τ = αCt
ρ =
αD
αC
a = ρ · βDCµCµD + γDDφDCµC + γDCφCCµD
βDDµCµD + γDCφCDµD + γDDφDCµC
b =
1
ρ
· βCDµCµD + γCCφCDµD + γCDφDDµC
βCCµCµD + γCDφDCµC + γCCφCCµD
(5.4)
5.2. Null model 95
The slow system in (5.1) becomes
dx
dτ
= x(1− x− ay)
dy
dτ
= ρy(1− y − bx),
(5.5)
in which x and y are rescaled abundance of Curvibacter sp. and Duganella
sp.; τ is rescaled time; a, b, and ρ are parameters without units.
This brings us back to the classic case of competitive exclusion [May and
McLean, 2007; Murray, 2007]. There are four possible equilibrium states
(x∗, y∗) are (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and ( 1−a
1−ab ,
1−b
1−ab). An equilibrium is biologi-
cally meaningful if both x and y are non-negative. Depending on the relative
size of a and b, the qualitative structures of the phase plane dynamics are
shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Qualitative structures of bacterial interactions. x and y axes are
the densities of x and y, which represent the rescaled densities of Curvibacter
sp. and Duganella sp. Depending on the relative size of parameters a and
b, the rescaled system either leads to the extinction of one of the bacteria
(competitive exclusion), or the coexistence of the two bacteria at a unique
equilibrium state. (a) a < 1 and b < 1, (b) a > 1 and b > 1, (c) a > 1 and
b < 1, (d) a < 1 and b > 1.
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To sum up the null model, if the production rates of phages depend on
bacterial densities in a linear manner, as assumed in the first two equations
in (5.1), the population dynamics of the two bacteria recovers the classic case
of competitive exclusion.
More importantly, the analysis of the null model tells us that the basic
interactions alone are not able to produce frequency dependent growth rates
of bacteria, nor the resultant alternative coexisting states of the population.
In the following, we build a new model based on the null model, taking into
account the evolutionary aspects of phage adapting to hosts and the active
defence of the hosts against phage through OMVs.
5.3 Working model
First we take into account the evolutionary aspect of phage host range. We
assume that phages adapt to bacterial hosts in a frequency dependent manner,
because it is the most profitable to adapt to the host species that is the
most abundant. Note that this is achieved through natural selection, rather
than the “active decisions” of phages. Phages mutate randomly, but only the
adapted variations are preserved, and the rest are eliminated from the system.
In this ODE model, we only model the overall behaviour of a phage species,
neglecting the detailed dynamics of different strains within the same species.
Using the dynamics of Curvibacter -phage in the null model as an example,
P˙C = γCCC + γDCD − µCPC (5.6)
we add in the effects of adaptation to changing frequencies of bacteria.
For example, as Duganella sp. increase in frequency in the population, the
Curvibacter -phage would be selected to adapt to the more abundant Duganella
sp. As a consequence, the infection rate to the original host species γCC
decreases by a factor 1−λDC DC+D , in which 0 6 λDC 6 1. The parameter λDC
adjusts the cost of adapting to the alternative host. We model the early stage
of adaptation mainly through the frequency dependent decrease of infection
rate to the original host species. Because the time period of adaptation is
so short, we assume that the infection rate to the alternative host has not
increased substantially. Therefore the term γDCD, which captures the rate
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at which Curvibacter -phage is produced from the cross-infection of Duganella
sp., is kept unchanged.
After taking into account the effects of phage adaptation, we add in the
effects of bacterial defence. Using OMVs as decoys is supposed to be a defence
mechanism against many different phages in general. To keep the model
simple, we assume that phages may have different attachment rates to OMVs,
but they do not distinguish between OMVs produced by different bacteria.
And we also assume that the two bacteria produce OMVs at equal rates,
so that the total density of OMVs is proportional to the total density of
bacteria. Therefore the deactivation rates of phages are also proportional
to the total density of bacteria. In the null model, we use µ to denote the
spontaneous decay rate of bacteria: µC is the spontaneous decay rate of the
Curvibacter -phage, and µD is the spontaneous decay rate of the Duganella-
phage. In the working model, phages are removed not by spontaneous decay,
but from the defence activity of bacteria by OMVs. We use µ˜ to summarize
the attachment rate of phages to OMVs, and the rate at which OMVs are
produced by bacteria: µ˜C is the deactivation rate of the Curvibacter -phage,
and µ˜D is the deactivation rate of the Duganella-phage.
In the working model, we keep the slow system that describes the density
dynamics of bacteria unchanged. Taking both phage adaptation and host
defence into account, the fast system describing phage population dynamics
in the null model is modified to:
P˙C = γCCC
(
1− λDC D
C +D
)
+ γDCD − µ˜C(C +D)PC
P˙D = γDDD
(
1− λCD C
C +D
)
+ γDCC − µ˜D(C +D)PD
(5.7)
A graphical illustration of the modification of the model is shown in Figure
5.3. We analyse the working model in the following.
First, we calculate the equilibrium of the fast system of phage density
dynamics:
P ∗C =
γCCC
2 + (γCC + γDC − γCCλDC)CD + γDCD2
µ˜C(C +D)2
P ∗D =
γDCC
2 + (γDC + γDD − γDDλCD)CD + γDDD2
µ˜D(C +D)2
(5.8)
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Figure 5.3: Interactions among bacteria and phages. Building on the null
model, now we take into account phage adaptation and host defence mecha-
nisms, as shown in the colored circles.
Inserting the equilibrium of the fast system into the slow system, which is kept
the same as in the last two equations in (5.1), the slow system of bacterial
population dynamics can be arranged into the following form, in which the
parameters ζ0, ζ1, ζ2, η0, η1, and η2 are constant:
C˙ =
[
ζ2
(
C
C +D
)2
+ ζ1
(
C
C +D
)
+ ζ0
]
C − βCCC2 − βDCCD
D˙ =
[
η2
(
C
C +D
)2
+ η1
(
C
C +D
)
+ η0
]
D − βDDD2 − βCDCD
(5.9)
During the exponential growth phage when the density of bacteria are low,
competitions are negligible. Therefore the second order terms of bacterial
densities in (5.9) can be ignored. Denote the frequency of Curvibacter sp.
as f , which equals C/(C + D), and neglecting the competition terms with
contains C2, D2 or CD, we reach a structure of nonlinear frequency dependent
growth rates similar to the experimental observations in Li et al. [2015b]:
C˙ = (ζ2f
2 + ζ1f + ζ0)C
D˙ = (η2f
2 + η1f + η0)D,
(5.10)
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with the parameters:
ζ2 = −γCCλDC
µ˜C
φCC − γDDλCD
µ˜D
φDC
ζ1 = −γCC − γDC − γCCλDC
µ˜C
φCC − γDC − γDD − γDDλCD
µ˜D
φDC
ζ0 = αC − γDC
µ˜C
φCC − γDD
µ˜D
φDC
η2 = −γCCλDC
µ˜C
φCD − γDDλCD
µ˜D
φDD
η1 = −γCC − γDC − γCCλDC
µ˜C
φCD − γDC − γDD − γDDλCD
µ˜D
φDD
η0 = αD − γDC
µ˜C
φCD − γDD
µ˜D
φDD
(5.11)
But in the work of [Li et al., 2015b], the frequency dependent growth rate
of Curvibacter sp. is rather linear than quadratic. This implies that ζ2 → 0.
In the next we integrate experimental results into the mathematical model
to recover this observation, and at the same time gain new insights of the
biological system from mathematical analysis.
Our preliminary experiment results indicate that it is generally hard for
the Duganella-phage to infect Curvibacter sp. Therefore the value of φDC is
very small. Under the condition φDC → 0, the form of ζ2 becomes:
ζ ′2 = −
γCCλDC
µ˜C
φCC (5.12)
From the experiments we are certain that Curvibacter -phage can infect
Curvibacter sp., and by lysing the cells of Curvibacter sp., infectious par-
ticles of Curvibacter -phage are produced. Therefore γCC and φCC must take
nonzero values. In order to have ζ ′2 → 0, it requires that λDC → 0. On the
other hand, because the frequency dependent growth rate of Duganella sp. is
quadratic, η2 must be nonzero. This requires that λCD > 0.
This asymmetry implies that it is very costly for the Duganella-phage
to switch host and infect Curvibacter sp., but it is almost no cost for the
Curvibacter -phage to switch host and infect Duganella sp. Biologically this
suggests that the Curvibacter -phage is a generalist, and the Duganella phage
is a specialist. The resulting structure of interactions are shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Interactions that recover the linear frequency dependent growth
rate of Curvibacter sp. and the quadratic frequency dependent growth rate
of Duganella sp. The asymmetry in the infection network shows that the
Curvibacter -phage plays the role of a generalist and the Duganella-phage plays
the role of a specialist.
In this work, from analysing the null model we show that simple infection
and cross-infection of bacteria by phages in a linear manner cannot produce
frequency dependent growth rates. Taking into account the adaptation of
phages to the changing frequencies of bacteria hosts, and the active defence of
bacteria by producing OMVs, we build a simple mathematical model of phage-
bacteria interactions that can produce frequency dependent growth rates of
bacteria. Feeding experimental results to the general model, we recover the
observation of linear and quadratic frequency dependent growth rates of bac-
teria in Li et al. [2015b]. In addition, from the mathematical analysis, we gain
knowledge on the ecological nature of the two phages, one as a generalist and
the other as a specialist.
5.4 Discussion
The first interesting finding of this work is that our null model recovers the
classic case of competitive exclusion. Although we have brought in additional
actors (i.e. the phages) to the system, the overall behavior of the bacterial
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population dynamics remains qualitatively the same as if there is no phage in-
volved at all. This tells us that without additional factors, such as adaptation
of phages to changing frequencies of bacteria hosts or life history tradeoffs,
the fact that phages being able to infect and cross-infect different bacteria
species per se do not contribute to the maintenance of biodiversity. This is
in agreement with the conclusion of Jover et al. [2013], where the tradeoffs
between life-history traits of both bacteria and phages are essential for stable
coexistence.
Quantitatively however, the presence of phages can change the outcome
of bacterial competition. In the null model, the relative sizes of parameters
a and b determine which bacterial species dominates the other. The activity
of phages may indeed change the outcome of bacterial population dynamics,
by changing the values of parameters a and b. For example, when phages
are not present, one bacteria species may always outcompete the other; but
they might be able to coexist if phages are introduced into the system. The
two bacteria exclude each other if either a or b is greater than one. But if
the activity of phages change the values of a and b, bringing both to values
below one, the two bacteria can stably coexist. However, without explicit
experimental designs with phage-free controls, simply from the observation of
competitive exclusion, it is not possible to tell if such population dynamics is
caused by bacterial competitions alone, or if phages are also involved.
Previous studies on the “killing-the-winner” (KTW) theory have shown
that phages can contribute to the coexistence of bacteria by preferentially
killing bacteria with the highest frequency in the population [Koskella and
Meaden, 2013; Thingstad, 2000; Winter et al., 2010]. Through negative fre-
quency dependent selection, the KTW theory provides a mechanism of pro-
moting biodiversity in microbial communities. However, KTW models nor-
mally assume that each of the bacterial species is infected by strictly one
specialist phage [Middelboe et al., 2001, 2008; Miki et al., 2008; Thingstad,
2000]. In the original model of Thingstad [2000], the author also assumes that
all bacteria compete for the same substrate resource, and are under nonselec-
tive predation from the same protozoan predator.
To test the KTW model experimentally and also elucidate the role of
predation, in Middelboe et al. [2001], the authors combined simulation and
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experimental approaches. The four phage species were isolated from the ma-
rine surface water. They are chosen and experimentally confirmed to be host
specific. This makes it satisfies the model assumption that one phage only
infect one bacteria and one bacteria is infected by only one phage. The results
confirmed the strong effects of viral lysis on bacterial population dynamics.
The authors also showed from simulations that the nonspecific predation of a
common protozoan grazer reduces the amplitudes of bacterial population size
fluctuations, but increases the frequency of such fluctuations. Besides bacteria
and phages, the model also considers many other factors such as the inflow
and outflow of carbon sources, dilution, as well as different nutrition uptake
rates by bacteria of different radii. Despite being biologically more realistic,
this limits the mathematical tractability of the model.
In the working model, we show that the combined effects of phage adap-
tation and host defence can produce frequency dependent growth rates of
bacteria and the resultant alternative coexisting states. When modeling the
adaptation of phages, we use the parameter λ to describe how aptly a phage
responds to the fluctuation of relative frequencies of bacteria in the popula-
tion. Biologically, it captures the fitness cost inflicted by switching to another
host. If λ is small, it is cheap for a phage to switch to infecting an alternative
host. In our system, it corresponds to the case of the Curvibacter -phage. On
the other hand, if λ is large, it would be very costly for the phage to switch to
another host, especially when the frequency of the alternative host is not very
high. In our system, it corresponds to the case of the Duganella-phage. This is
in agreement with our experimental observations that the Curvibacter -phage
often cross-infect Duganella sp., but not the other way round.
It is important to note that we do not assume explicitly a tradeoff between
phage host range and the efficiency of infection, as required in the model of
[Jover et al., 2013]. In order to produce alternative coexisting states, for our
model the only requirement is that the two quadratic growth rate functions in
(5.10) intersect twice within the range of 0 < f < 1. As included in equations
(5.11), besides the efficiency of phage infection, many other factors can have
an effect, including the rates at which phage particles are produced from
lysing different bacteria cells, the costs of switching hosts, reproduction rates
of bacteria and the deactivation rates of phages by OMVs. This may explain
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the rather equivocal empirical observations on the tradeoffs between phage
host range and the efficiency of infection [Avrani et al., 2011; Lennon et al.,
2007]. In our model, other factors can also contribute to the maintenance of
biodiversity, so it is not that phages with broader host ranges have to be less
efficient.
Another interesting finding from our model analysis is that it also re-
quires that bacterial hosts defend themselves against phage infections actively.
Across a wide range of environmental habitats, bacteria and phages generally
represent the most abundant and genetically diverse groups of organisms [Ed-
wards and Rohwer, 2005; Fraser et al., 2009; Torsvik et al., 2002]. It has been
proposed that such diversity is mostly driven by the arms race between phage
adaptation and host resistance [Labrie et al., 2010]. Except using OMVs as de-
coys, there are many other mechanisms through which bacteria defend against
bacterial infections. For example, one of the mechanisms is to prevent phages
from adsorption by blocking phage receptors [Foster, 2005], or by producing
extracellular matrix [Hammad, 1998], or even by producing competitive in-
hibitors [Destoumieux-Garzón et al., 2005]. Other commonly used strategies
include blocking DNA injection, cutting phage nucleic acids, and bacterial
suicide through the abortive infection systems [Dy et al., 2014; Labrie et al.,
2010]. Although we already have good empirical knowledge on the molecular
mechanisms of bacterial defence, little modeling work has been done to com-
pare the effects of different mechanisms on the population dynamics of phages
and bacteria quantitatively.
Various factors affect the arms race of phage infectivity and bacterial re-
sistance, including phage adsorption via specific receptors [Chatterjee and
Rothenberg, 2012], structural change of both phages and their bacterial host
[Mahony and Van Sinderen, 2012], injecting nucleic acids into bacterial cells
and defence against degradation [Richter et al., 2012], and the presence of
phage resistance plasmid in the host cells [de Vos et al., 1984; Deng et al.,
1997]. There are also cases of cryptic phenotypic resistance, where the bac-
teria remain genetically sensitive, but being able to attain high density as if
they are resistant [Bull et al., 2014]. But the costs to either phages or bacteria
inflicted in these processes are largely unknown. Albeit accumulating empir-
ical findings, there is still very little modeling work that studies the detailed
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mechanisms of these biological processes quantitatively. A rare example is the
work of Smith and Trevino [2009], where the authors built a stochastic model
of phage-bacteria population dynamics, taking into account the detailed dy-
namics of multiple phages adsorb to one single host cell. The authors not only
simulated the stochastic processes, but also analysed the associated determin-
istic model, showing that the reproductive number for phage proliferation has
to exceed one for the persistence of both phages and bacteria. They also
calculated the distribution of the numbers of adsorbed phage on one single
bacterial cell.
Beyond the detailed mechanisms of infection and resistance, there is also
great need of knowledge on the general principles which determine the set
of phages that can infect a bacteria species, and the group of bacteria that
a phage can infect. Taking a statistical approach, Flores et al. [2011] per-
formed a detailed metaanalysis of the infection relationships across a wide
habitat spectrum. They show that the infection network is featured by a
nested structure and the absence of modularity. Findings of general princi-
ples like such greatly facilitate modeling works by providing a justified ground
to build on. In fact, recent mathematical models of Jover et al. [2013] and
Thingstad et al. [2014] are both built on the nested structure. In another
modeling work, Beckett and Williams [2013] show that the “nested-modular”
interaction networks found in Atlantic Ocean samples can be produced by a
simple ODE model of host-phage coevolution, where infectivity depends on
genetic matching. See Weitz et al. [2013] for a recent review on phage-bacteria
infection networks.
It is also crucial to distinguish and reintegrate interactions that operate
on different time scales. In the evolutionary time scale, the arms race between
phages and bacteria propelled by mutation and natural selection ultimately
drives the generation and maintenance of biodiversity. However, under some
experimental conditions, ecological processes such as the Lotka-Volterra dy-
namics may take up a more important role. For example, the experiments
in the work of Middelboe et al. [2001] show that viral lysis only have tem-
porary effects on the population dynamics of the bacterial hosts. Resistance
against phages evolved quickly after the initial lysis of sensitive host cells.
Consequently, interspecific competitions among the phage-resistant bacterial
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strains become the driving force of population dynamics, in only a few gen-
erations after the lysis event. But in most cases, the effects of evolution and
ecology are combined and hard to separate, as reviewed in Jessup and Forde
[2008].
In our working model, the formulation of host range evolution of phages
can only capture the initial phase of adaptation, when the decrease of infec-
tion rate to the original host species is relatively large, and the increase in
the infection rate to the new host species is rather small. This corresponds
to the time scale of the experiments in Chapter 4, where we observed fre-
quency dependent growth rates of Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp., and the
alternative coexisting states of the two bacteria. It has been found experi-
mentally that within the hydra host, Curvibacter sp. is the most abundant in
frequency, and it plays the role of keystone species in maintaining the compo-
sition of host microbiota [Fraune et al., 2014]. This might be a benefit from
hosting the generalist Curvibacter -phage, which has little cost to switch to
infecting other bacteria when their frequencies become too high.

Chapter 6
Summary and Outlook
Evolutionary game theory provides a useful framework for studying the evo-
lution of strategic behaviours, such as cooperation and reciprocity. It also
contributes to our understanding about many biological phenomena, such as
the one to one sex ratio observed in various different species. But classic evo-
lutionary game theory models take very little consideration of the life history
traits of individuals nor the demographic structure of populations. In addi-
tion, it mainly focuses on the dynamics of frequency, rather than the absolute
quantity/density of different phenotypes. But these often neglected factors
can play an important role in determining the population dynamics in many
biological systems. For example, many insect species experience distinct life
stages, performing different ecological functions in each of them. Also, in
many microbial communities, such as the human and animal microbiota, the
population size of different bacteria can fluctuate considerably within a short
period of time. The central theme of this thesis is to integrate indispensable
biological factors back into evolutionary game theory models. Sometimes this
is necessary in order to capture the essential features of population dynamics,
and to elucidate the underlying mechanisms that produce these features.
The first factor we take into consideration is the life history of individuals
and the corresponding demographic structure of the population. Life history
theory has provided a systematic way to study the evolution of aging, life his-
tory tradeoffs, and reproductive schedules. But traditional life history models
are often based on optimisation algorithms, neglecting interactions within the
population and the resultant changes of the fitness landscape. In Chapter 2,
we incorporate these factors into evolutionary game theory through models
with life stage dependent strategies. For species with different life stages, an
individual can behave differently at different times. In addition, behaviours
can be conditioned on the current life stage of the focal individual, that of its
opponent, or the matching of life stages between the two. By analysing the
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replicator dynamics of life-stage dependent strategies, we show that an integra-
tion of life history and evolutionary games can alter the population dynamics
substantially. The diversity of life stage structures and life stage dependent
strategies can promote each other through interactions in the population. In
addition, we show that the distribution of different strategic behaviours at
equilibrium can be different from that predicted by game theoretic interac-
tions alone. Starting from the same frequency of a certain behaviour (e.g.
cooperation), populations with different demographic structures can evolve
towards different states.
Although the replicator dynamics has many convenient mathematical
properties (see Chapter 1), it is based on the assumption of infinite popula-
tion size. But the finiteness of population size and the resultant stochasticity
of the system can be important in many biological populations. In order to
study the evolutionary fate of mutants and the effects of extinction events, we
have to analyse the corresponding stochastic processes. Thus, in Chapter 3 we
continue to study the interactions of life history and evolutionary games, but
instead of focusing on the average frequency changes of standing variations,
we explore the evolutionary fate of beneficial mutants in adaptive evolution.
In stochastic population models, the detailed strategy interactions and popu-
lation state update rules allow us to investigate the effects of different selective
forces. We show that the evolutionary fate of a beneficial mutant, charactered
by its fixation probability, can differ greatly when natural selection works on
reproduction, survival or a combination of both. Moreover, we are able to as-
sess the relative importance of the size and the demographic structure of the
populations, in determining the fixation probability of a beneficial mutant.
Although our models in Chapter 3 capture the effects of stochasticity that
is absent in the deterministic models in Chapter 2, they have so far not taken
into account of frequency dependent selection. On the one hand, adding pop-
ulation demographic structure while keeping constant selection makes it possi-
ble to compare our results with those from classic population genetics models;
on the other hand, it would be an interesting topic for the future to study
the effects of frequency dependent selection in evolutionary games. In fact,
frequency dependent selection can be important in determining population
dynamics. An example is shown in Chapter 4, where we study the evolution-
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ary games between two bacterial species (Curvibacter sp. and Duganella sp.),
which are isolated from the Hydra microbiome. The growth rate of Duganella
sp. is a quadratic function and the growth rate of Curvibacter sp. is a lin-
ear function. Incorporating the frequency dependent growth rates into the
Lotka-Volterra dynamics, we build a mathematical model that recovers the
alternative coexisting states of the two bacteria.
Besides frequency dependent effects, in Chapter 4, we also show the impor-
tance of considering the absolute density in characterising population dynam-
ics, especially in populations that can experience considerable size changes.
For the same trajectories of population growth in co-culture experiments, if we
only look at the frequency dynamics, it resembles the typical case of coordina-
tion game. Depending on the initial condition, the frequency of one bacterium
approaches one, and the frequency of the other approaches zero. However, if
we also look at the population dynamics represented by the changes of den-
sity, the picture is completely different. The two competing bacterial species
have both increased their absolute density greatly during the course of 60
hours of growth. Even the submissive species has increased its absolute den-
sity by a factor of a hundred at the end of the experiments. Taken together
frequency and density dynamics, the whole picture of the bacterial games can
be illustrated by drawing a paralell to economic inflation. The rich becomes
richer and the poor poorer (frequency dynamics), although everybody has
more money by the end (density dynamics). The complex population growth
pattern arisen from the seemingly simple evolutionary game between two bac-
teria highlights the fundamental importance of frequency dependent selection
on population dynamics.
In Chapter 4, we show that frequency dependent growth rates can produce
alternative coexisting states in growing bacterial populations. From mathe-
matical analysis we also show that it is not possible to produce such complex
population dynamics by bacterial cells interacting in pairwise games. One po-
tential explanation indicated by preliminary experiments is that there might
be invisible players (e.g. phages) involved in the games. In order to find out
the microscopic mechanisms that can produce such macroscopic frequency
dependent growth rates, we study a model of phage-bacteria interactions in
Chapter 5. We show that phages being able to infect and cross-infect bacterial
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cells per se do not contribute to the deviation from competitive exclusion of
the co-culture system. On the other hand, a combined effect of phage adap-
tation and bacterial defence can produce frequency dependent growth rate of
bacteria and the resultant alternative coexisting states in the population.
In the work presented in the four projects from Chapter 2 to 5, we develop
models that rely on as few assumptions as possible, but being able to capture
the most important features of the biological systems under investigation, and
to facilitate our understanding of the underlying mechanisms. It is tantalising
to incorporate more biological factors into evolutionary game theory models
and assess their relative importance, but this inevitably increases the com-
plexity and very often reduces the tractability of the models. For example, it
would be interesting to study frequency dependent game interactions in age
structured populations with selection working on reproduction or survival or
a combination of both. This would also connect the questions we studied
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. However, because of the much increased com-
plexity, we have to make additional assumptions and approximations, such as
assuming infinitely large population size and weak selection (the technique is
introduced in Chapter 1) in order to gain analytical insights.
Besides incorporating more factors in order to make the models more bio-
logically relevant, another future direction I would like to explore is to simplify
models which describe biological phenomena in great detail, so that they might
reduce to processes that can be captured by evolutionary games. Another in-
teresting future direction is to develop models that help explain the increasing
amount of biological data. Our modelling work should go beyond statistical
descriptions, but explain the mechanisms that produce the observed patterns.
For example, it would be interesting to develop a mechanistic model that
can explain the dynamic “in-out-in” colonisation pattern of the microbiota of
neonatal animals, and link it with sequencing data from experiments.
Chapter 7
Appendices
7.1 Appendix of Chapter 2
7.1.1 Linear Stability Analysis of the fixed points in Fig-
ure 2.3 of Chapter 2
The fixed points where three strategies coexist are as following:
1.
(
(n2−n−2)(−2p+1)
2n2(2pHH−1)+4(p−pHH)
,
(n−1)(n(p+2pHH−2)+2pHH)
2n2(2pHH−1)+4(p−pHH)
,
(n−1)(n(p+2pHH−1)+2(pHH−1))
2n2(2pHH−1)+4(p−pHH)
, 0
)
2.
(
(n+1)p
n2(p+pHH)+p−pHH
, n−1
n2(p+pHH)+p−pHH
, 0,
(n−1)(n(p+pHH)+pHH−1)
n2(p+pHH)+p−pHH
)
3.
(
(n+1)(p−1)
n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH
, 0, −n+1
n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH
,
(n−1)(n(p+pHH−2)+pHH)
n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH
)
In addition, there is a line of fixed points on the HD−DH−DD surface,
(0, n(p−1)x+1
np
, x, 1 − x − n(p−1)x+1
np
), independent of pHH . Depending on the
values of n, p, and pHH , some of the fixed points may fall out of the S4 simplex.
The linear stability of the fixed points can be determined by the sign of
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed points. For example,
at the fixed point where HH, HD and DD coexist, the three eigenvalues of
the Jacobian Matrix are:
1. −(n−1)np(1+p)+
√
p
√
n2(p3−2p2+p+4(pHH)2)+4n(−p2+p−p pHH+2(pHH)2−pHH)+4(p−p pHH+(pHH)2−pHH)
4((n2+1)p+(n2−1)pHH)
2. − (n2−1)(p−pHH)
2((n2+1)p+(n2−1)pHH)
3. −(n−1)np(1+p)−
√
p
√
n2(p3−2p2+p+4(pHH)2)+4n(−p2+p−p pHH+2(pHH)2−pHH)+4(p−p pHH+(pHH)2−pHH)
4((n2+1)p+(n2−1)pHH)
The first eigenvalue is always negative. The second eigenvalue is negative
when pHH < p, and is positive when pHH > p. The third eigenvalue is negative
when pHH < p and n >
1−pHH
p+pHH
, and it is positive when pHH > p or n <
1−pHH
p+pHH
.
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Therefore in the case where the cost of conflict is fairly large, n > 1−p
H
H
p+pHH
, the
stability of the fixed point where HH, HD and DD coexist is determined by
the relative size of pHH and p. If pHH < p, the fixed point is a stable node, if
pHH > p, the fixed point is a saddle point.
Another interesting fixed point is where HH, DH and DD coexist. The
three eigenvalues of the Jacobian Matrix are:
1. −(n−1)n(−p2+3p−2)+
√
1−p
√
n2(−p3+p2+4(pHH−1)2)−4n(p2−2p+p pHH−2(pHH)2+2pHH)−4p pHH+4(pHH)2
4(n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH)
2. − (n2−1)(p−pHH)
2(n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH)
3. −(n−1)n(−p2+3p−2)−
√
1−p
√
n2(−p3+p2+4(pHH−1)2)−4n(p2−2p+p pHH−2(pHH)2+2pHH)−4p pHH+4(pHH)2
4(n2(p+pHH−2)+p−pHH)
Like the previous case, the first eigenvalue is always negative. The second
eigenvalue is negative when pHH > p, and is positive when pHH < p. The third
eigenvalue is negative when pHH > p and n >
pHH
2−p−pHH
, and is positive when
pHH < p or n <
pHH
2−p−pHH
. Therefore in the case where n > p
H
H
2−p−pHH
, the stability
of the fixed point changes with the relative sizes of pHH and p. If pHH > p, the
fixed point is a stable node, if pHH < p, the fixed point is a saddle point.
Taken the stability of the two fixed points together, within the regime
where the cost of conflict is relatively large, n > 1−p
H
H
p+pHH
and n > p
H
H
2−p−pHH
, the
stability of the two fixed point switches.
When pHH < p, the fixed point at which HH,HD,DD coexist is stable,
and the fixed point at which HH,DH,DD coexist is unstable. When pHH > p,
the HH,HD,DD fixed point is unstable, and the HH,DH,DD fixed point
is stable. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
We solved for the fixed points and performed the linear stability analysis
first using the symbolic mathematical software Mathematica 9.0.1 and subse-
quently verified all results manually. When analysing the switch of stability
of the two fixed points where HD or DH coexist with the two “pure strate-
gies" HH and DD, it is instructive to make use of the built-in “Manipulate"
function of Mathematica. For example, one can plot the values of the three
eigenvalues with respect to n, and observe the changes of the signs of the three
eigenvalues while changing p and pHH . Our Mathematica file is available as a
Supplementary Material to this paper.
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7.2 Appendix of Chapter 3
7.2.1 Fixation probability of a single mutant in the
young age class
Fisher’s reproductive value vk of an individual in age class k in an age-
structured population with pre-breeding census is [Charlesworth et al., 1994]:
vk =
λk
lk
ω∑
x=k
lxmxλ
−x (7.1)
in which λ is the asymptotic growth rate of the population, lk is the probability
of an individual surviving at least to age class k, mk is the expected number
of offspring in the first age class produced by an individual in the k − th age
class in the last time step, and ω is the maximum attainable age. In our
specific model of two age classes (ω = 2), the parameter values are, λ = 1
(constant population size), l1 = 1, l2 = N2/N1, and m1 = m2 = N1/N , where
N = N1 +N2
We have v1 = 1 and v2 = N1/N ≡ f . Following Emigh [1979a], the fixation
probability of a selectively neutral mutant is
v1
v1N1 + v2N2
=
1
Nf(2− f) . (7.2)
7.2.2 Selection on reproduction
7.2.2.1 Expected value of mutants in the next time step
In the following we use B(x(t+1)1 ) as the shorthand for
B
(
x
(t+1)
1 ;N1,
r(x
(t)
1 +x
(t)
2 )
r(x
(t)
1 +x
(t)
2 )+N1−x(t)1 +N2−x(t)2
)
and H(x(t+1)2 ) as the shorthand
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for H
(
x
(t+1)
2 ;N1, x
(t)
1 , N2
)
.
E[x
(t+1)
1 + x
(t+1)
2 ] =
N1∑
x
(t+1)
1 =0
N2∑
x
(t+1)
2 =0
B(x
(t+1)
1 )H(x
(t+1)
2 )(x
(t+1)
1 + x
(t+1)
2 )
=
N1∑
x
(t+1)
1 =0
B(x
(t+1)
1 )
N2∑
x
(t+1)
2 =0
(
H(x
(t+1)
2 )x
(t+1)
1 +H(x
(t+1)
2 )x
(t+1)
2
)
=
N1∑
x
(t+1)
1 =0
B(x
(t+1)
1 )
(
x
(t+1)
1 +
x
(t)
1 N2
N1
)
=
x
(t)
1 N2
N1
+
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )N1
(r − 1)(x(t)1 + x(t)2 ) +N1 +N2
(7.3)
7.2.2.2 N∗1 < N always holds when r > 1
N∗1 =
√√√√x(t)1 N
(
1 +
N − x(t)1 − x(t)2
r(x
(t)
1 + x
(t)
2 )
)
(7.4)
Requiring N∗1 < N , we solve the inequality for r.
r > 1− x
(t)
2 N
(N − x(t)1 )(x(t)1 + x(t)2 )
(7.5)
Starting from one single mutant in the young age class, initially x(t)1 = 1,
and x(t)2 = 0. Therefore the requirement becomes r > 1. For advantageous
mutants, this requirement is always satisfied.
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7.2.3 Effects of linear allocation of benefits
Imagine that the mutant allocates its extra benefit in a linear way. Relative
to wild types, the mutant has an extra payoff s. She allocates a fraction of it
to increase her reproduction, and use the rest to improve survival. Therefore
her relative fitness for reproduction r1 = 1 + as, and her relative fitness for
survival r2 = 1 + (1 − a)s. In Figure 7.1 we show the effects on fixation
probability of this particular way of allocating extra benefits.
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Figure 7.1: Effects on fixation probability of a mutant that has an extra
fitness benefit of s = 0.2. (a) In general the fixation probability increases
monotonically with the fraction of benefits allocated to reproduction. In the
older population, the frequency of young individual is 0.55, and in the younger
population, the frequency of young individual is 0.95. (b) If the fraction of
benefits that can be allocated to reproduction is fixed, the fixation proba-
bility varies in a non-linear way in populations with different demographic
structures. a is the fraction of extra benefits that is allocated to reproduc-
tion. (N = 20, a Mathematica notebook file for generating this figure can be
found in the Supplementary Information).
7.2.4 The fixation probability increases with population
size in the Wright Fisher process when r is large
When r is small, the fixation probability of a beneficial mutant decreases with
increasing size of the population, approaching 2(r − 1). But when r is large,
the fixation probability first decreases and than increase again, although the
magnitude of increase is rather small, see Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Fixation probability of a single beneficial mutant in the Wright-
Fisher process. In the left panel when the selective advantage of the mutant
is small, as population size grows, the fixation probability approaches the
classic result of 2(r − 1). In the right panel, when the conditions of diffusion
approximation are not satisfied, the fixation probability first decreases and
then increase again as population size increases.
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Figure 7.3: A 3-player evolutionary game that produces frequency dependent
growth rates and two internal equilibria. The payoff matrix of the three-player
game is shown in (a). The two internal equilibria are shown in the frequency
(b) and density (c) plots.
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